






























































The Consumer Guide to Competition
Handbook was written by Phil Evans at
Consumers Association, UK and edited by
Lezak Shallat from Consumers International
Regional Office in Santiago, Chile. This work
was undertaken within the Consumer
Movement and Competition Policy Post Doha
programme, which is funded by the UK
Department For International Development
(DFID). However, in addition to gratefully
acknowledging the support of DFID, this work
built on existing activities funded by the Ford
Foundation, the ministry of foreign affairs of
the Dutch Government, the European Union,
the International Development and Research
Centre (IDRC), and Oxfam.
Designed and produced by Steve Paveley
© Consumers International
March 2003







Section 1: Competition and competition policy 9
Part I: What is competition? 10







Efficiency and productivity gains 15
What about jobs? 17
Part III: Impact of Competition Law and Policy 19
Section 2: Consumers and competition 23
Part I: Markets and consumer behaviour 24




Undermining the model of rational consumers 28
When the rational model does not apply 29
Part II: Defining the market 31
Geographic market definition 31
How it is currently done 31
The end of geography? 32
Van Thunen Circles 32
Internet market definition 32
Matrix of key questions 33
Contents
The consumer guide to competition: A practical handbook
Product market definition 33
How it is currently done 33
Substitutability 33
What’s needed: Time in substitutability assessments 34
Working time into assessments 35
Demand-side complementarities 36
Supply side substitution 37
Part III: Calculating market shares 38
How it is currently done 38
Doing the sums 38
Step down differences between market shares 40
Temporal aspects to concentration 41
What’s needed: Impact of external trade 41
Problems with indices 42
Part IV: Assessing vertically integrated markets 43
How it is currently done 43
Two-stage process 44
Tying 45
Part V: Mitigating factors in assessments of market power 46
How it is currently done 46
Countervailing power 47
Technological innovation 48
Part VI: Barriers to entry, establishment and exit 49
How it is currently done 49
Barriers to entry 49
Structural barriers and market entry 52
Barriers to establishment 52
Part VII: Strategic behaviour 52
How it is currently done 52
Bertrand or cournot? 53
Predatory pricing 54
Fighting brands, fighting ships and reputation 55
The chain store paradox and signalling 55
Part VIII: Aiming for workable competition 56
Section 3: Consumers and regulation 57
Part I: Regulation: What it is, why it has grown 58
What exactly is regulation? 58
Why regulation has grown 59
Part II: Regulation and market failure 61
Why regulation should happen 61
4
Contents
Part III: Why regulation happens 63
Why regulation does happen 63
Theory of regulation: Stigler-Peltzman 63
Role of interest groups 64
Watching out for the bootleggers 66
Part IV: Government failure, regulators and regulation 67
Government failure and the role of regulators 67
Identifying government failure 68
Comparing market with non-market failure 70
Part V: Getting regulation to work for consumers 72
When will regulation be successful? 72
Attempts at reforming regulation 74
Section 4: Conclusions 77
Targets for regulation 80
The process for regulating in normal markets 80
Who can best deal with the spillover effects? 81
How will improved efficiency and redistribution affect rent seeking? 81
Appendices 83
Appendix I: Behaviour, structure, strategy/conduct, performance, policy 84
Appendix II: Hints on decision-making and the analytical approach 85
Appendix III: Possible errors in market assessments 86
Appendix IV : Factoring in consumer behaviour 87
Appendix V: Structure-conduct-performance paradigm 90
Endnotes 91
What is Consumers International? 95
5
“Chaos, illumined by flashes of lightning”
– Oscar Wilde on Robert Browning’s style 1
The analysis of markets is not an exact
science but a combination of evidence-
based research and analytical interpretation.
This handbook does not aim to provide an
exact roadmap of ‘how-to’ proportions but
to describe the parameters of thinking
generally contained in market structure
analyses and competition investigations.
More importantly, this handbook aims to
indicate the range of issues that competition
analysis can cover and point out potential
problem areas for those of us involved in
representing the consumer interest in
competition cases.
In addition to providing a guide to competition
policy investigations, this handbook also
suggests improvements to the existing
methodologies in the area of consumer
behaviour, plus new approaches in geographic
market definition and substitutability.
Incorporation of consumer behaviour more
firmly into the assessment of competition 
cases focuses on developing a matrix of
indicators to assess the degree to which the
implicit model of consumer behaviour will
hold true. The key problem here is the scarcity
of hard and fast indicators of consumer
behaviour other than ones derived from 
actual purchasing behaviour. As a result, the
indicators we propose are more about
identifying barriers to consumer rationality
than indicating the degree of that irrationality
itself. The advantage of this approach is that it
allows the pinpointing of specific barriers to
rationality in individual markets and gives
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structure to assessments both of competition
problems and the likely success of regulatory
solutions.
The additions we recommend in the definition
of relevant geographic markets are also related
to the ways consumers behave within normally
defined geographic markets. Established
methodologies generally use proxy indicators
and measures of substitutability in the market
as guides to defining the market. We are not
proposing to scrap those indicators but to
complement them with more consumer-focused
ones. In particular, we recommend additional
measurements of consumer mobility and
purchasing behaviour within markets to
ascertain the degree to which consumers 
define their own geographic markets.
We also propose several ways forward to
incorporate the development of e-commerce
into geographic market definition. We argue 
for the use of data about Internet usage by
consumers that is tied to an understanding of
the distribution of consumers within the
market. This will help pinpoint the potential 
for e-commerce to have an effect on off-line
retailers and suppliers.
In the field of substitutability analysis, we
propose a series of indicators to gauge the
likelihood that consumers will invest time in
seeking substitutes. The measures are similar in
scope to those used in defining the role of the
consumer in competition investigations.
However, they are more capable of having real
data tied to them and are more explicit about
the judgmental weightings built into the overall
scale. Again, the aim is not to supplant
established methodology but to supplement
established methods with consumer-focused
indicators.
Assessing assumptions
No one comes to the topic of competition
without a host of prejudices and historical
baggage, and assessment of markets rests on a
number of these views. Aside from the
established rules of economics and lessons from
the study of markets, the following
assumptions make a useful starting point:




Markets exist only because 
of consumers
Consumption is the sole end and purpose of
production, and the interest of the producer
ought to be attended to only so far as it may be
necessary for promoting that of the consumer. –
Adam Smith 2
We sometimes forget that the market is only in
existence because of the consumer. The
definitions of markets tend to focus on the
firms that operate in them. If we think of
markets in this way we miss the centrality of
the consumer to understanding how the market
functions. We also end up with regulatory
solutions that favour businesses over
consumers and aid collusion and abuse of
competition.
Competition operates in the real world
The social object of skilled investment should be
to defeat the dark forces of time and ignorance
which envelop our future – 
John Maynard Keynes 3
You can’t step twice into the same river –
Heraclitus
We must subscribe to the post-Keynesian view
of the world:
• Economic and political institutions are not
negligible
• The economy is a process in historical 
(real) time
• In a world where uncertainty and surprises
are unavoidable, expectations have an
unavoidable and significant effect on
economic outcomes.4
Markets are complex and operate in real time.
Any assessment of a market must take account
of this and not rely on simple snapshots or
static views of competition.
There is more collusion in ordinary
markets than most people presume
Adam Smith argued that '(p)eople of the same
trade seldom meet together, even for merriment
and diversion, but the conversation ends in a
conspiracy against the public, or in some
contrivance to raise prices.’ 5
Many consumers and regulators like to think
that the natural state of markets is competition.
In fact, the natural state of markets is more
likely to be collusive. The desire of companies
and their managers to have a 'quiet life'
encourages collusion and undermines
competition. This is not to say that all
industries are riddled with anti-competitive
behaviour – some are, and some are not.
However, it does indicate that there are many
more abuses of competition and consumers
than most people would expect.
Government is not blameless
There used to be essentially two views on the
source of monopoly power.6 These views were
divided into:
• self-sufficiency: firms gain monopoly power
under their own steam:
• interventionist: monopoly power is accrued
as a result of government intervention 
or failure.
In the real world, it is unlikely that either view
will always be correct. In most cases, the
accrual of monopoly power will arise from an
interaction of the two sources.
Established approaches only tell
part of the story
Competition regulation tends to analyse firms
in markets and has less experience in dealing
with consumers in markets. Inability to factor
real consumer behaviour into analysis will limit
responses to cases, reduce the ability to propose
real solutions and hamper the recognition of
‘emergent properties’ in markets that a holistic
view of a market will provide.
Competition is not an end in itself
Cecil Graham: What is a cynic?
Lord Darlington: A man who knows the price of
everything and the value of nothing.
– Oscar Wilde, Lady Windermere’s Fan (1892) 
While the study of markets and promotion of
competition are important exercises, it must be
remembered that the object of the market is not
The consumer guide to competition: A practical handbook
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competition. We must raise our eyes from the
workings of the market to really see what sort
of world we want to live in.
Markets are good at providing
allocative efficiency, not
distributional equity
Competition analysis and investigations are
good for improving allocative efficiency but not
for dealing with distributional equity. It is quite
dangerous to confuse the two targets. 
Allocative efficiency, or Pareto
efficiency/optimality, occurs when it is not
possible for anyone to be made better off
without making someone else worse off. Pareto
efficiency can be seen in conjunction with a
Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium occurs
when a firm aims for profit maximisation at the
same time as competing firms, and means that
no firm can gain by changing its strategy from
the one it has independently chosen.
Distributional equity is a broader social concern
driven by a desire to strive towards what
Tobin7 has called 'specific egalitarianism'. This
is the concern to ensure that distribution of a
resource or service is done in a manner that is
less unequal than the simple ability-to-pay
solution would provide for. A distributional
equity solution may involve measures outside
and beyond the assessment of allocative
efficiency. As we discuss below, the decision-
making process should assess and aim for the
allocative efficiency position before considering
what distributional impacts may be.





Raymond Carver, one of the finest American
short-story writers of the 20th century,
produced a collection entitled “What Do We
Talk About When We Talk About Love?’ The
same question can be asked about
competition. Like love, we know competition
when we see it. But when we try to pin down
exactly what it is, we find ourselves tripping
over words and definitions. Like love,
competition tends to be viewed in different
ways by different people. This section
outlines what competition is, what it is not
and what it might become. It also discusses
some important distinctions between
competition, competition law, competition
policy and regulation. 
At its most basic, competition is the process of
rivalry between firms and other suppliers for
the money and loyalty of customers over a
period of time. The nature of this rivalry
depends to some degree on the structures
apparent in the marketplace and the history
and culture both of consumers and producers
in that market. This rivalry tends to focus on
one of two routes, or a combination thereof:
• Price-based competition: rivals compete to
cut their costs and prices to catch the
attention of customers.
• Service-based competition: rivals go beyond
price offers and offer differentiated service
offers. These may sometimes include
innovations in product and service markets. 
The package that the consumer sees in a
competitive market is a often combination of
these two approaches. 
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The classic approach to competition stems from
Adam Smith’s notion that competition occurred
when rivals acted in isolation from one another.
Collusion would not generate competition.
Following individual self-interest, when
collected together in a market, would generate
the best economic outcome. Smith’s focus on
the ‘Invisible Hand’ that guides individual
actors in an economy to a wider end to which
they had not strived has taken on almost
mythical proportions in the modern
understanding of markets. 
Smith’s approach to competition was a
behavioural one. Competition worked on the
basis of the behaviour of individual players in
that market and would be stymied by the
monopolistic behaviour of those same players.
The market was almost an exterior result of
individual behaviours which none of the
players aimed for but arrived at, courtesy of the
Invisible Hand. 
During the 19th century, a more structural view
of competition emerged. This approach
generated the widely held view that a market
could be defined as competitive when there
was a sufficiently large pool of sellers of a
homogenous (identical) product so that no
sellers had a enough of a market share to
enable them to influence product price by
altering the quantity they placed on the market. 
The more structural approach of the 1930-40s
led to the development of the Structure,
Conduct, Performance approach to industrial
organisation. This approach marked a huge
step forward in the understanding of markets
and is still remarkably influential today. 
The behavioural approach tends to be strongest
among the business community. It focuses on
the behaviour of firms and tends to argue that
if there is a competition problem, amending the
behaviour of firms within that market will
deliver results. The behaviouralist error focuses
almost exclusively on the appearance of rivalry
presented by businesses. 
In contrast, the structural approach looks
almost exclusively at the market structure and
assumes a deterministic relationship between




structure, conduct and performance. It tends to
argue that getting the structures right in the
market will drive behavioural changes. 
The behavioural and structural approaches can
lead to opposite errors in the analysis of
competition in a marketplace. Taking too
absolutist a line in looking at markets in either
tradition can lead to the following errors:
• The behaviouralist error assumes that firms,
left to their own devices, will tend towards
competition. This is typified in the Chicago
School /Robert Bork approach to competition
investigation which rests on the implicit
moral superiority of capitalist enterprises
over government regulation. It assumes that
markets are best left to themselves and that if
there is a breach of competition rules,
behavioural remedies are best – simply
directing the firms to their previous narrow
path of competitive virtue. This type of error
predisposes the proponent to leave markets
alone for too long.
• The structuralist error assumes that all
behaviour in markets is driven by the
structure in that market. This tends to lead
proponents to a reductionist, deterministic
approach that assumes that all you have to
do is get the structures right (e.g.: where
there are few firms, they must be colluding
and must be broken up) and the desired
behaviour will follow. This type of error
leads to a more intrusive regulatory approach
to competition problems. 
The two errors tie rather neatly into FM
Scherer’s acute observation, as described in his
classic textbook8, about the difference between
rivalry and competition. He defines rivalry as
the process by which business people
consciously jockey for position against rival
firms. This, he argues, is often defined by those
business people as competition. However, you
can have rivalry without vigorous competition
and competition without rivalry (e.g. on
commodity trading systems). 
This distinction between rivalry and
competition is an important and useful one for
consumer organisations. We are often faced
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with markets where firms maintain that they
are competing vigorously for consumers’
money, whereas we sense that the market is not
working as well as it could in the interest of
consumers. 
Part I: What is competition 
Competition and competition policy
The process of competition and its
manifestation in rivalry between firms
delivers a number of things in those
markets where it is strong. The effects of
competition can be generally grouped into
two broad areas: those directly relevant for
consumers and those indirectly relevant 
for consumers. 
Direct gains
It is always more straightforward to prove the
disadvantages for consumers where there is no
competition than it is to prove how good it is
for consumers when competition exists. This is
for a number of reasons, most notably that
when measuring the impact of the blocking of a
merger, or the liberalisation of a market it is
almost impossible to separate out each of the
possible reasons for a change in pricing or
choice. There are always ‘other factors’ that
come into play. However, there are some
general things that can be said to flow directly
from competition.
Lower prices
The greater the competition within a market,
the more likely vigorous price competition will
occur. In contrast, monopolists’ only incentive
is to keep prices high. This poses a
fundamental problem for consumers in dealing
with pricing, a problem that rests on whether
you can tell from price alone whether a market
is competitive or not. 
Economic theory tends to argue that in a
perfectly competitive market, prices will be
driven as near as possible to marginal cost. In





harmonised prices. At the same time, a market
run by a cartel, or in which there is price-fixing
or collusion, will also tend toward a single
price. The conundrum for consumer
organisations is whether this single price is
evidence of near-perfect competition or near-
absolute lack of competition. The answer to this
conundrum requires steering a path between
the behavioural/structural errors outlined
above. 
Looking for collusion
While there are no cast-iron pointers to guide
the consumer activist, the following signs may
point to collusion:
• What opportunities does the industry have
to meet and discuss prices and output? 
If there is a strong industry lobby group,
regular conferences and regular closed
meetings, the industry has the opportunity to
engage in anti-competitive behaviour more
easily than an industry without such
opportunities. It is a lot easier to create a cartel
at the fringes of a regular industry meeting or
conference than to organise a stand-alone
group that has to be established specifically 
for the task.
• Does the industry tend to speak with the
same voice? 
In a highly competitive market, it is rare that all
players will have the same view of an issue.
While there will be many common issues on
which they may agree (e.g. levels of taxation or
regulatory burdens), beware of the industry in
which there appears to be one voice only. This
points to an industry where the culture is one
of co-operation, not competition.
• How much price and cost signalling is there? 
Collusion is easier if you know your rivals’
prices and costs. Look at the market and see
how easy it is for firms to see each other’s
prices and understand each other’s costs. For
example, in petroleum retailing, most firms are
totally vertically integrated and the product
they deal with is pretty much identical. Each
firm thus knows that its own costs are unlikely
to be significantly different to its rivals. The
nature of retailing in this oligopoly market
means that each firm knows its rivals’ prices
and has a fair understanding of their costs.
Part II: What competition does
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show that prospective competition (as proxied
by the number of years remaining to
liberalisation) and effective competition (as
proxied by the share of new entrants or by the
number of competitors) both bring about
productivity and quality improvements and
reduce the prices of all the telecommunications
services considered in the analysis. No clear
evidence could be found concerning the effects
on performance of the ownership structure of
the industry (as proxied by both the public
share in the PTO and years remaining to
privatisation). Severin Borenstein, Nancy Rose.
Competition and Price Dispersion in the U.S.
Airline Industry. July 1991. NBER Working
Paper No. W3785 
The pattern of price dispersion that we find does
not seem to be explained solely by cost
differences. Dispersion is higher on more
competitive routes, possibly reflecting a pattern
of discrimination against customers who are less
willing to switch to alternative flights or airlines.
We argue that the data support an explanation
based on theories of price discrimination in
monopolistically competitive industries. 
Eric Kodjo Ralph, Jens Ludwig. Competition
and Telephone Penetration: An International
Statistical Comparison. By using the natural
experiment in world telephony markets where
nations have chosen vastly different regulatory
regimes, this paper shows how competition
spurs telecommunications penetration. Further,
we show that moving from two to three or
more firms is more important than moving
from one to two, and that actual entry matters
more than the threat of entry. This is of
economic as well as policy interest since game-
theoretic models yield ambiguous predictions
about oligopoly and monopoly when entry is
threatened. 
Aaron S Edlin. Do Guaranteed-Low-Price
Policies Guarantee High Prices, and Can
Antitrust Rise to the Challenge? Harvard Law
Review, Vol. 111, No. 2, December 1997.
This article argues that there is an analogy
between a seller offering (and agreeing) to
match a price for a buyer and other buyer-seller
agreements that violate the Sherman Act. This
article also considers a wholly new avenue for
Firms can estimate margins and the ability of
its rivals to engage in different levels of price
competition. If each player in a tight oligopoly
market knows price, costs and long run
margins, competition on price is extremely
unlikely.  
What experience has taught us
The positive price effects of competition are
enormously important. For consumer
organisations in some nations, competition may
be seen as a luxury or as a tool for the middle
classes. In other nations, consumer
organisations may ask: “What does competition
policy mean to a consumer living on less than a
dollar a day?” The simple answer lies in being
able to stretch that dollar further and having
greater choice in where that dollar is spent.
Turn the question around, and it is even easier
to understand: “What good is a monopoly to a
consumer living on less than a dollar a day?”
Prices matter: they matter most for those with
the least to spend. An interest in driving prices
down through competition is an interest shared
by all consumers. If competition can drive
down prices, then we must look to the policy
mix that helps deliver competition. The mix
will include reducing barriers to entry in
markets (through trade liberalisation, removing
restrictive regulations and getting governments
out of some markets) as well as rules to stop
companies from simply controlling a market for
their own benefit. Competition is not created by
competition policy but competition policy can
protect competition once it occurs. 
EVIDENCE FILE No. 
Oliver Boylaud, Giuseppe Nicoletti. OECD
Economics Department. Regulation, Market
Structure and Performance in
Telecommunications Economics Department.
April 21, 2000. OECD Economics Department
Working Paper No. 237 
Controlling for technology developments and
differences in economic structure, panel data
(long-distance (domestic and international) and
mobile cellular telephony services in 23 OECD
countries over the 1991-1997 period) estimates
Competition and competition policy
attacking price matching, asking whether the
price discrimination involved in matching
violates the unfair-competition or price-
discrimination laws. In so doing, this article
examines whether price matchers should be
able to protect themselves from such an attack
with a "meeting competition" defence. Breaking
with conventional wisdom, this article
concludes that the defence should be rejected 
in cases in which meeting competition may
significantly injure competition among sellers. 
More choice
The other clear and obvious benefit of
competition is that it can generate more choice.
Instead of the one monopoly supplier,
consumers can choose from different options.
For example, in the telephony market, the
choice for many years was a land-line, if you
could get one at all. This land-line tended to be
controlled by the national, government-owned
monopoly. The arrival of competitors in land-
line operations in many countries changed this
state of affairs. However, the biggest shift in the
market has been driven by the arrival of mobile
telephony. This has not only provided more
choice but also helped open access to the
market for many more consumers than could
previously access a fixed land-line. 
New entrants
A competitive market can trigger market entry.
(Of course, market entry can be triggered by
flabby monopolists.) The argument about entry
reflects the idea that entry will only tend to
occur where a potential new player sees
attractive margins being earned by existing
players. Thus a lack of competition triggers
entry. However, a firm entering a market can
only survive if it can compete with rivals. If the
market is sewn up through collusion or
government regulation, then the new entrant
will simply not survive. 
What experience has taught us
Choice is sometimes seen as some terrible
problem for the middle classes, but where
consumers can exercise choice, we should be
empowered to do so. Competition can deliver
choice at its most basic level. When a country
like India effectively has only one make of car
for many years, consumers are denied choice.
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But when other firms are allowed to compete,
consumers have a choice. What’s more,
innovation is driven into the sector, as
previously dominant players have to fight for
consumer money. However, choice does not
deliver everything. In some markets, choice is
difficult either because the market is complex
or because the market is made complex by
existing players to confuse consumers into
sticking with the firms they recognise. There
are real barriers to choice that must be
recognised in drawing up regulations.
EVIDENCE FILE No. 
Mary W Sullivan. US Department of Justice.
The Effect of the Big Eight Accounting Firm
Mergers on the Market for Audit Services.
March 17, 2000. Working Paper No. EAG 00-2.
The research assesses how the two Big Eight
mergers of 1989 affected the market for audit
services. A data set of 1,978 firms over a 12-
year period is used to test four theories of how
the mergers could have affected competition
and consumer welfare. The study finds that the
mergers reduced the marginal costs of auditing
large clients. There is no evidence that the
mergers were anticompetitive or that they
reduced costs for all types of audit buyers. 
Better service
It may seem a strange to argue that competition
delivers better service. It helps to identify what
we mean by service. For example, in the
aviation market, service is generally defined to
include frequency and punctuality as well as
the cup of tea or coffee. Back in the 1970s, prior
to liberalisation, US airlines competed almost
entirely on ‘service’ rather than prices (which
were fixed). This led to such insane ‘service’
offerings as in-flight cocktail piano bars and
playboy bunnies. Bloated fares and lack of
competition encouraged the airlines to waste
money on gratuitous service ‘innovations’. 
What experience has taught us
Monopoly providers offer little choice and get
lazy, which drives down service quality (e.g.
Aeroflot in the 1970-80s) or encourages them to
invest huge amounts of money on excessive
frills (e.g. US airlines in the early 1970s). Either
Part II: What competition does
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way, the consumer loses. Service quality tends
to improve when firms are forced to compete
with other firms. Why would a monopoly
provider bother to provide a better service
when it knows it will not be punished if it 
does not? 
Indirect gains
While the direct gains of competition are
relatively easy to identify, the indirect gains are
more difficult. However, the relationship
between the direct and indirect gains is
important to investigate. Indirect gains through
enhanced efficiency, productivity and even
profitability can result in even greater gains for
consumers. In a competitive market, the
relationship between direct and indirect gains
can form a virtuous circle. In monopolised
markets, the opposite may be true: lack of
direct gains for consumers can form a vicious
circle resulting in the destruction of efficiency,
productivity and profitability that reduces the
possibility of future gains for consumers. 
Efficiency and productivity gains
Efficiency and productivity gains for firms are
not usually viewed as being a benefit delivered
to consumers from competition. But when
certain conditions are met, such gains can form
a virtuous circle of competition, efficiency and
productivity. When consumers choose between
products on an individual basis, they signal
their preferences. When these individual
preferences are aggregated together, firms
receive a clear market signal of what consumers
want (and do not want) and what to produce.
When a firm loses out, it is spurred on to find
ways to recapture consumer preferences either
by cutting costs (to undercut their competitors),
or by innovating and producing a better
product to recapture these preferences, or both.
This constant need to capture consumer
preferences forces firms into a never-ending
search for the productivity gains and efficiency
enhancements that will allow them to go one-
up on their rivals. 
This competition-productivity-efficiency drive
can bring about a situation where consumers
benefit from better service and lower prices
while firms in the market see profit
enhancements. An example of this comes from
the UK supermarket sector, where retail prices
have been declining steadily over recent years
as profits have been rising. Consumers have
been reaping a fair share of the benefits of
competition between the main players.                 
What experience has taught us
The indirect gains from competition may appear
to be of secondary interest to consumers, but
they are of fundamental importance over the
long-term. More productive and efficient use of
resources helps an economy to develop more
quickly and leads to a higher standards of
living. (It does not, however, deal with issues of
income distribution). More dynamic firms tend
to innovate more and be more responsive to
their consumers. This triggers new products,
new markets and new approaches to consumer-
industry relations. Efficiency and productivity
gains from competition are actually the most
important long-term benefit a consumer can
receive from competition.
EVIDENCE FILE No. 
Richard Disney, Jonathan Haskell, Ylva Heden.
Restructuring and Productivity Growth in UK
Manufacturing. May 2000 CEPR Discussion
Paper No. 2463 
We find that (a) 'external restructuring'
accounts for 50% of labour productivity growth
and 90% of TFP growth over the period; (b)
much of the external restructuring effect comes
from multi-establishment firms closing down
poorly-performing plants and opening high-
performing new ones, and (c) external
competition is an important determinant of
internal restructuring. 
Francesco Trillas Jane, The Structure of
Corporate Ownership in Privatised Utilities.
September 2002. CEPR Discussion Paper 
No. 3563 
In the benchmark case where the government
maximizes privatisation proceeds, it is shown
that the optimal level of concentration increases
with a tougher regulatory climate for investors.
A more lenient regulatory regime increases the
value of the commitment not to interfere
implicit in a more dispersed ownership
structure. Deregulation (through increasing
monitoring costs) also pushes corporate
structure in the direction of more ownership
concentration. When political objectives are
added to the analysis, it is shown that lobbying
with managers induces levels of shareholder
dispersion that are higher than in the
benchmark case. Collusion with large
shareholders, however, may yield higher
concentration levels than in the benchmark. In
the case of managerial lobbying, the leniency of
the regulatory climate does not have any
impact on the equilibrium stake of the block
holder, and has a negative impact on the
difference between the political and the
benchmark outcomes. 
Mariko Sakakibara, Michael E Porter.
Competing at Home to Win Abroad: Evidence
from Japanese Industry.
We find robust evidence that domestic rivalry
has a positive and significant relationship with
trade performance measured by world export
share, particularly when R&D intensity reveals
opportunities for dynamic improvement and
innovation. Conversely, trade protection
reduces export performance. These findings
support the view that local competition, not
monopoly, collusion, or a sheltered home
market, pressures dynamic improvement that
leads to international competitiveness. 
Frank R Lichtenberg. Industrial De-
Diversification and Its Consequences for
Productivity. January 1990. Jerome Levy
Economics Institute Working Paper No. 35 
Using plant-level Census Bureau data, we show
that productivity is inversely related to the
degree of diversification: holding constant the
number of the parent firm's plants, the greater
the number of industries in which the parent
operates, the lower the productivity of its
plants. Hence de-diversification is one of the
means by which recent takeovers have
contributed to U.S. productivity growth. We
also find that the effectiveness of regulations
governing disclosure by companies of financial
information for their industry segments was
low when they were introduced in the 1970s
and has been declining ever since.
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Michael Gort, Nakil Sung. Competition and
Productivity Growth: The Case of the US
Telephone Industry. Economic Inquiry.
Abstract:     
Both the estimation of total factor productivity
growth and the analysis of cost shifts show a
markedly faster change in efficiency in the
effectively competitive market than for the local
monopolies. The results support, by
implication, a policy of permitting entry and
competition in local telephone markets.
Jalana D Akhavein, Allan N Berger, David B
Humphrey. The Effects of Megamergers on
Efficiency and Prices: Evidence from a Bank
Profit Function. January 1997. FEDS Paper
Number 97-9.
We find that merged banks experience a
statistically significant 16 percentage point
average increase in profit efficiency rank relative
to other large banks. Most of the improvement is
from increasing revenues, including a shift in
outputs from securities to loans, a higher-valued
product. Improvements were greatest for the
banks with the lowest efficiencies prior to
merging, who therefore had the greatest capacity
for improvement. By comparison, the effects on
profits from merger-related changes in prices
were found to be very small.
Sumit K Majumdar. The Hidden Hand and the
License Raj: An Evaluation of the Relationship
Between Age and the Growth of Firms in India.
Imperial College of Science, Technology and
Medicine, Management School Forthcoming in
Journal of Business Venturing 
The evidence suggests that entrepreneurial
behaviour is an important feature of
contemporary Indian industry. Recent
anecdotes about Indian firms, particularly in
the information technology sector, suggest that
there has been a resurgence of industrial
activity in the country. These beliefs are borne
out by the analysis. The "hidden hand" is alive
and well in India! Additionally, the relationship
between size and the growth of Indian firms is
negative. This suggests that a process of
industrial fragmentation may be taking place in
Indian industry, with small firms growing
faster than larger firms and reducing the
Competition and competition policy
importance of large firms in Indian industry.
This has important implications for the future
competitiveness of Indian industry.
Allen N Berger, David B Humphrey. Bank Scale
Economies, Mergers, Concentration, and
Efficiency: The U.S. Experience
Scale and scope economies in banking are not
found to be important, except for the smallest
banks. X-efficiency, or managerial ability to
control costs, is of much greater magnitude – 
at least 20% of banking costs. Mergers have no
significant predictable effect on efficiency –
some mergers raise efficiency but others lower
it. Market concentration results in slightly less
favourable prices for customers, but has little
effect on profitability.
Allen N Berger, Timothy H Hannan. The
Efficiency Cost of Market Power in the Banking
Industry: A Test of the ‘Quiet Life’ and Related
Hypotheses.
We find the estimated efficiency cost of
concentration to be several times larger than
the social losses from mispricing as
traditionally measured by the welfare triangle.
What about jobs?
Employment and unemployment are major
concerns in all countries. It is often argued in
the popular press that greater competition
leads to higher unemployment and worse
employment prospects for workers. This belief
is supported by the evidence of immediate
post-privatisation restructurings that often
centre on job losses. Stories of job loss generally
receive more coverage than stories of job
creation. When a factory shuts down and a
thousand workers are laid off, it is not hard to
identify the immediate losers from the process.
In contrast, having ten firms employ 100 extra
people does not grab tomorrow’s headlines.
The problem with the relationship between
competition and employment is that measuring
direct effects is complex. For example, when a
new firm sets up shop and enters a market, the
immediate employment impact is positive. In
the long run, however, that firm might displace
another or force the rival firm to engage in
efficiency measures that require it to cut
employment levels. 
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A basic argument about the relationship
between competition and employment comes
from its obverse relationship. In monopoly
situations, a share of monopoly power is often
exercised by the employees. This can be
beneficial in terms of wages and working
conditions. The correlation between monopoly
power (public or private) and restrictive
practices by workers is fairly close. It makes
intuitive sense that when a firm has a
privileged position, its employees are able to
extract greater benefits from that firm at a
lower cost to that firm, because the firm can
pass on these additional costs on to its
customers. Almost every nationalised postal,
railway, utility and national airline company
has faced this problem. We often find,
particularly in developing countries, that these
firms are akin to arms of the state designed to
employ large numbers of people as an
alternative to the welfare state.
The problem with workers extracting a share of
the benefits from the monopoly firm is that it
tends to be a short-term benefit which later
endangers the entire enterprise when
competition is introduced. Sharing monopoly
rents only works as long as there are monopoly
rents to share. When firms lose money, the
monopolist is left either to extract more
revenue from customers or from the taxpayer
through the state. The subsidy afforded by the
state is thus shared between the monopolist
and its employees. 
When competition is introduced, the incumbent
monopolist tends to be lumbered with a
bloated cost base (as its monopoly position
invited inefficiency and encouraged its workers
to extract ever-higher wages at the expense of
consumers). New entrants are not faced with
this legacy problem and can thus come in with
significantly lower costs. The impact on the
incumbents will vary by industry. 
The immediate likely impact on employment is
thus negative from competition. Determining
medium to long-term impact, however, is more
difficult. Competition drives efficiency into
resource allocation. If investors find that capital
invested in a monopolist comes under pressure,
they will likely seek to invest that capital where
the return is better. Loss of capital from a
Part II: What competition does
monopolist almost certainly means that another
firm or sector will benefit from increased
investment and will be better able to 
employ people. 
What experience has taught us
Consumer organisations have a real dilemma
with employment issues in competition
matters, for diverse reasons. As concerned
citizenry with current or potential alliances to
other groups that may benefit from maintaining
the status quo, it is easy for consumer
organisations to get drawn into protectionist
arguments against competition. The high-
profile nature of many deregulation initiatives
and liberalisation efforts makes every job loss a
political issue. It is always difficult to sit
opposite people who will lose their jobs and
argue that the move will lead to long-term
gains and better employment prospects for
others. (As Keynes argued, in the long run we
are all dead.) But the truth is that more
competition, particularly among dominant
incumbents, is good for the consumer, good for
the economy and good for employment.
EVIDENCE FILE No. 
Pietro F Peretto. Market Power, Growth and
Unemployment. March 1998 Duke University,
Economics Working Paper No. 98-16.
Labour market reforms that reduce the cost of
labour have effects in the product market that
reinforce the modern view that a more
competitive labour market leads to lower
unemployment. This implies that such reforms
are even more attractive than previously
thought. In agreement with the idea that
product market competition matters, moreover,
I show that lower barriers to entry in the
product market lead to lower unemployment. 
Marianne Bertrand, Francis Kramarz. Does
Entry Regulation Hinder Job Creation? Evidence
from the French Retail Industry. November 2001.
CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3039 
We show that stronger deterrence of entry by
the boards, and the increase in large retail
chains' concentration it induced, slowed down
employment growth in France. 
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Michael C Burda. Product Market Regulation
and Labour Market Outcomes: How Can
Deregulation Create Jobs? January 2000. 
CESifo Working Paper Series No. 230.
A non-negligible component of the recent
Dutch employment miracle could be attributed
to product market deregulation, in particular
liberalization of shop-closing laws effected in
the mid-1990s. I sketch a model, based on
Burda and Weil (1999), which can rationalize
potential public interest aspects of such
regulations as well as identify their
employment and output costs.
Competition and competition policy
The case that competition is generally good for
the economic well-being of a country is a
strong one. Similarly the argument that
competition damages workers’ rights is weak.
Of greater interest is the relationship between
competition and competition policy. This may
seem an academic point, but it is also important
for practical policymakers. If you want to
encourage competition, what balance of tools
and policies are needed to achieve this end? 
All advocates of competition and competition
law and policy recognise that these are only 
one element of the toolkit to foster a more
competitive economy. Within the area of
regulation that we loosely refer to as
competition policy, a range of policies exists
aimed at diverse areas of activity. We can divide
these policies along the following continuum:
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Competition law and policy take different
forms in different countries. Most countries
seek a phased approach to their development.
Cartel rules and rules on price-fixing are
usually the first to be brought in, followed by
increasingly tough rules on mergers and
collusive behaviour. (Most developed countries,
for example, had fairly strong laws on cartels,
and price fixing before they had firm rules on
mergers.) Sectoral regulation only comes into
its own during deregulation efforts. Obviously,
sectoral regulation rules were not thought of
before countries started to privatise their 
public utilities. 
As the table on page 20 illustrates, the pattern
of adoption of different elements of a
competition regime can be done on a graduated
approach. While competition advocates will
differ about which element goes where, it
provides a useful typology for thinking about
how countries new to competition enforcement
should deal with competition law and policy. 





Area of activity Type of policy
Government-supplied services Monitoring, target setting, competitive neutrality 
with private sector
Public utilities Basic sectoral regulation
Introduction of competitors
Competitive tendering
Privatised public utilities Sectoral regulation  Competition regulation
Private firms acting individually Rules on anti-competitive behaviour, price fixing,
abuse of dominance, predatory pricing
Private firms knowingly acting together Rules on market division, market sharing, price 
fixing, collusion on keeping others out, cartel 
formation
Private firms effectively acting together Oligopoly rules for firms that effectively do not 
compete, market review mechanisms to inject 
competition
Private firms merging Rules on mergers
If a country wishes to privatise a publicly
owned company, it must recognise that it is
moving from what is termed a ‘high trust’ form
of regulation to a ‘low trust’ form of regulation.
High-trust regulation assumes that those
carrying out the activity have a wider remit
and broader accountability to elected officials.
Low-trust regulation assumes that the firm will
behave in a narrowly self-interested way (as
private firms are supposed to). This move from
high-trust to low-trust demands sectoral and
competition regulation. When privatising, we
must assume that the newly minted private
firm will abuse whatever power it has. 
What does experience tell us?
Experience shows that the best way to deal
with this problem is to ensure as much
competition as possible before privatisation of
the domestic monopoly. Once competition has
started to bite, additional liberalisation can be
introduced, provided it is followed by sectoral
regulations to ensure that competition thrives.
If privatisations are not handled properly, the
consumer interest is undermined and serious
social problems, including unrest, can occur.
Competition policy is flexible; no one-size-fits-
all approach is possible. Countries can offer
advice and recommend reforms but they
themselves will be re-assessing on a permanent
basis how they conduct competition reforms.
Competition policy is about getting the toolkit
right to protect consumers and foster
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competition, not about requiring countries 
to follow a rigid path to development. 
EVIDENCE FILE No. 
George Symeonidis. Price Competition,
Innovation and Profitability: Theory and UK
Evidence. University of Essex – Department of
Economics; Centre for Economic Policy
Research (CEPR) May 2001. CEPR Discussion
Paper No. 2816 
The econometric results suggest that the
introduction of restrictive practices legislation
in the UK had no significant effect on the
number of innovations commercialised in
previously cartelised R&D-intensive
manufacturing industries, while it caused a
significant rise in concentration in these
industries. In the short run profitability
decreased, but in the long run it was restored
through the rise in concentration. 
Brian R Cheffins. Investor Sentiment and
Antitrust Law as Determinants of Corporate
Ownership Structure: The Great Merger Wave
of 1897 to 1903. Faculty of Law, University of
Cambridge.
One theme the paper develops is that mergers
matter with respect to the evolution of systems
of ownership and control. A second topic the
paper deals with is the process by which a
Competition and competition policy
Different stages of development for a national competition regime
Start Enhancement Advancement Maturity
Competition advocacy and Merger control Regulation Second generation
public education international agreements
Control of horizontal Vertical restraints International  Pro-active competition
restraints co-operation advocacy
agreements
Checking abuse of Development of
dominance effects doctrine
Exceptions and exemptions, 
including on public interest 
grounds
Technical assistance
Source: Gesner Oliviera after Shyam Khemani and Mark Dutz. 1996. The Instruments of Competition Policy and their Relevance for Economic 
Development. PSD Occasional Paper No. 26. World Bank. Quoted in P Mehta. 2003. Friends of Competition. CUTS, Jaipur. 
country's investors become sufficiently
comfortable owning publicly traded shares to
permit a transition from concentrated to
dispersed share ownership. A third theme the
paper emphasizes is antitrust law's significance.
The experience in the U.S. and Germany
suggests that the legal status of anti-
competitive alliances is a potentially important
determinant of corporate ownership structures. 
J Gregory Sidak, Michael K Block, F C Nold.
The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement.
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 89, No. 3, 1980.
We show that a cartel's optimal price is likely to
be neither the competitive price nor the price
that the cartel would see in the absence of
antitrust enforcement but rather an
intermediate price that depends on the levels of
antitrust enforcement efforts and penalties. Our
empirical results reveal that increasing antitrust
enforcement in the presence of a credible threat
of large damage awards has the deterrent effect
of reducing mark-ups in the bread industry. 
J Gregory Sidak. Rethinking Antitrust
Damages. Stanford Law Review, Vol. 33, 1981.
Part I analyzes the consumer's economic injury
from exploitative behaviour and shows that,
prevailing contrary opinion notwithstanding,
the Clayton Act does not unambiguously
establish a consumer right to be free from such
injury. Because the prevailing interpretation
may cause allocative inefficiency, Part I
proposes a countervailing producer's right and
a corresponding damage rule. Part II analyzes
the kind of injury that competitors suffer from
expansionary behaviour. It criticizes the
competitor's right suggested by the current
damage rule and proposes an alternative right
and damage rule that would improve social
welfare by enhancing productive efficiency. Part
III proposes implementing the economic rights
suggested in Parts I and II through a judicial
test for calculating antitrust damages that
would restrict the availability of such damages. 
Bruce H Kobayashi. Antitrust, Agency and
Amnesty: An Economic Analysis of the
Criminal Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws
Against Corporations. George Mason Law &
Economics Research Paper No. 02-04.
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Because criminal fines are not accurate
measures of loss, and because of the vicarious
nature of corporate liability, there is a great
danger that higher-than-optimal penalties will
induce corporations to incur excessive costs in
an attempt to avoid these high fines. The
potential over deterrence costs resulting from
higher-than-optimal fines is exaggerated by the
Antitrust Division's expanded use of the
Corporate Leniency Policy. Ironically, the costs
of over deterrence will result in higher prices to
consumers, a decrease in welfare, and,
ultimately, in the exact effects that the criminal
antitrust laws are intended to prevent. 
Margaret C Levenstein, Valerie Y Suslow. 
What Determines Cartel Success? University of
Michigan Business School Working Paper 
No. 02-001.
Our examination of cartel duration concludes
that cartels are neither short-lived nor long-
lived; they are both. Similarly, our analysis of
the effect of cartels on prices and profitability
finds that there is enormous variance in cartel
success at raising price to the joint-profit
maximizing level. In our examination of cartel
breakdowns we find, as suggested by recent
theoretical literature, that cheating is a common
cause. Occurring even more frequently,
however, are entry, external shocks, and
bargaining problems, suggesting that these
issues should be given deeper consideration in
future work. Stigler's hypothesis that large
customers contribute to cartel breakdowns is
borne out in a few case studies. But there
appear to be more cases in our sample in which
large customers help to stabilize the cartel.
Only the oldest of suppositions, that highly
concentrated industries are more prone to
cartelisation, seems to hold true across studies.
Our inability to find more commonality among
these studies and among cartels does not
simply reflect our ignorance of cartel
operations or secrecy on the part of cartels (or
the different methodological approaches
covered in this survey). Rather, it reflects the
innumerable possibilities for organizing a
successful cartel, and the interdependence of
those factors determining cartel success.
Part III: Impact of competition law and policy
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Increasingly, competition regulators must
face up to the difficulties of conducting
market analysis in areas where consumer
behaviour is an important factor. This need
is most immediately felt in the investigatory
phase, when regulators map the market.
While the best regulators are attempting to
understand how consumers behave in the
market, this has tended to proceed on an
ad-hoc basis largely based on the interest of
staff and the willingness of panel members
to ensure its operation. However, the
importance of consumer behaviour must not
be underestimated in identifying possible
regulatory solutions to competition
problems. It is here that an understanding 
of drivers for consumer behaviour is
particularly important.
This section identifies ways to assess
consumer behaviour in competition
investigations. It starts from the
presumption that optimal consumer
behaviour in a market is characterised by
classical economic theory. However, a
combination of structural and behavioural
factors hamper the ability of consumers to
attain the model of rationality established in
classic economic theory. We therefore
present a matrix of factors and a scale of
importance to estimate the likelihood that
consumers will conform to this rational
consumer model. We hope these categories
of effects will provide a guide for indicators
of consumer behaviour to supplement the
more established methods of market
investigation.
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Why should we care?
The behaviour of consumers in markets is often
viewed as a ‘given’ in the analysis of
competition problems. Classically trained
economists have tended to view consumers as
rational beings who will pursue the maximum
benefit to themselves in a selfish way. The
messages transmitted to the market from this
individual behaviour will help direct resources
in an efficient manner and help drive markets
to more efficient operation. 
If competition investigations and analyses are
conducted on the basis that consumers act in a
determined manner, such investigations will
make certain assumptions at both the front and
back end of their deliberations. Thus, in the
investigation phase, regulators may assume a
certain pattern of behaviour corresponding to
what one would expect from a rational model of
consumer behaviour. Similarly, at the final stage
of investigation, regulators may assume that
consumers will behave in a classically ‘rational’
manner when remedies are introduced.
However, two key questions must be asked:
• To what degree does consumer behaviour
match the classical model?
• If it does not, what effect should this have 
on the manner in which markets are viewed
and regulated?
Classical model of 
consumer behaviour
The classical model of consumer behaviour
assumes that consumers do essentially three
things in making decisions: “All human
behaviour can be viewed as involving
participants who [i] maximise their utility [ii]
from a stable set of preferences and [iii]
accumulate an optimum amount of information
and other inputs in a variety of markets.” 9
To a large extent, the degree to which these
rules apply will indicate the degree to which
the assumption of consumer rationality applies.
For analytical purposes, we thus need to ask
the degree to which each rule applies.








Part I: Markets and consumer behaviour
1 Bounded rationality: Human cognitive
abilities are not infinite. (We all have limited
computational skills and flawed memories.)
2 Bounded willpower: People often take
actions in the short term that they know to be
in conflict with their own long-term interests.
3 Bounded self-interest: People generally care,
or act as if they care, about others, even
strangers, in some circumstances.10
Given these bounds on behaviour, we need to
identify the degree to which consumers act in
the classically rational manner. To do this, we
need to identify all the problems that get in the
way of consumers making rational decisions.
We can thus identify factors over which we
have little control and those that regulators 
and the operation of the market can affect.
Utility maximisation
The idea of the utility-maximising individual 
is key to the classical view of consumer
behaviour. However, it is also one of the
weakest links in the chain of argument that
seeks to place consumers within the rational
choice model. A number of important caveats
must be placed on the idea that consumers
pursue a utility-maximising approach. These
include cultural and peer group issues and
more basic structural processing issues on the
part of individuals. 
The following factors can limit the operation of
a utility-maximising consumer.
Cultural aspects to decision-making
Consumers do not behave in a vacuum in any
given market; their behaviour is circumscribed
by their own cultural norms and those
prevalent in the market. A clear understanding
is needed of a market culture and the degree to
which the consumer can operate comfortably
within it. 
Tests:
• What is the culture of the market in question?
• In what sub-culture does the market sit?
• How will changes to that market affect the
cultural interactions of participants?
The endowment effect: 
Any product that is already part of the
individual consumer’s existing endowment
will be more highly regarded than a product
that is not. Individuals tend to rate what they
already own higher than products that they do
not own. 
Tests:
• Proxy measures may include markets with
heavy advertising budgets and campaigns
aimed at boosting ‘new’ features to existing
products. This may spill over into misleading
and deceitful advertising. 
• Pressure advertising/marketing may be 
a problem
Sunk costs and the momentum theory 
The momentum theory argues that individuals
will complete a task once work has begun,
irrespective of the continuing validity of the
original decision. A sunk cost is an already-
borne cost that is not easily recoverable.
Individual sunk costs do affect decision-making. 
Tests:
Is this a market where:
• sunk costs are common, and legitimately so?
• final decisions are arrived at over time?
• consumers are required or encouraged to pay
for goods over time?
• the final quality of work is only ascertainable
long after payment?
• consumers have little opportunity to revisit
original decisions?
Psychic costs of regret
Present decisions may be affected when
individuals feel unable to trust themselves to
make correct decisions in the future.
Tests:
• Is there a mismatch between ‘objective’
measures of consumer need and ‘subjective’
assessments?
• Is there a need for compulsion in markets?
(e.g. health insurance)
• Is the market one that attracts lower income
consumers through its ability to discount
long-term fallibility in decision-making? (e.g.
Christmas Clubs)
• Is this business proposition risky enough to
warrant higher charges, opaque charging
information or high credit charges?
• Will comparative information limit the
potential for abuse?
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• What sources of information are available to
enable decisions to be made?
• How accurate is information about products/
services that incorporate losses (investment
product) and gains (M&S voucher)?
Stable preferences
The idea that consumers make decisions from a
foundation of stable preferences can be
undermined by many factors, including those
related to the risk and perceived risk of a
decision and the cost of getting a decision
wrong. The key difficulty, in analytical terms, of
identifying factors in the operation of
preferences is the close link between those
preferences and the idea of utility
maximisation. Many factors in consumer
behaviour that undermine the idea of the
utility-maximising individual also undermine
the idea that consumers operate from a set of
stable preferences. 
The operation of a stable set of preferences can
also be undermined by the nature of
consumption behaviour. For example, if the
consumers purchase a service or product that
requires them to use an intermediary for
advice, the preferences of the sellers will be as
important as those of the consumers. Similarly,
the transparency of the transaction will be
important, as will the degree to which the
product and/or service are bundled in a
package whose individual parts are difficult to
identify and accurately price. 
Optimal information
Much work has been carried out on the
problems of information transmission in
markets. The role of information economics has
grown over recent decades in response to the
problems faced by regulators in liberalising
markets and by companies operating in
complex markets. The 'common understanding'
reached is that information acts as a grease to
effective markets and the more information that
can be made available, the more effective this
grease will be. Unfortunately, the ability of
consumers to compute the information they
receive cannot match the desire of regulators
and companies to furnish that information. As
a result, information can actually limit the
effective operation of a market, or make it
slower to react to market mechanisms. 
Consumers and competition
Self-control and pre-commitment
Consumers often recognise that their existing
consumption patterns are incapable of meeting
certain future needs (e.g. Christmas spending,
retirement). This prompts saving and tying the
consumer into patterns of committed
expenditure. 
Tests:
• Is this a market where regular payments for
future goods are commonplace?
• How does the decision-effect-feedback loop
work in this market?
• How clear to the consumers are the costs 
of gradualism?
• How independent is the information
available to the consumer about the 
decision-effect-feedback loop?
Losses and gains treated differently
Because losses and gains are treated differently,
we need to have an understanding of how the
market in question treats losses and gains in
marketing and product/service provision.
Options for dealing with combinations of 
losses and gains:
• Segregate gains: Individuals prefer to treat
multiple gains as a series of individual gains.
(e.g. two gifts wrapped separately are
preferable to two gifts in a single wrapping).
• Integrate losses: Individuals like to place all
their losses in one basket.
• Let big gains cancel small losses: If the
overall balance of gains and losses is positive,
losses should be pooled with the gains to
cancel them out.
• Segregate ‘silver linings’: When large losses
out-weigh small gains, gains may be
separated out as a ‘silver lining’ to the cloud
of the large loss. 
• The picture becomes less clear when dealing
with smaller gains and losses. Here,
integration may be the preferred option.
Tests:
• What opportunity exists in the market for
consumers to bundle and re-bundle losses
and gains?
• How clear is the quality/price information in
bundled products/services? Can objective
calculations be made of relative
costs/benefits?
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Part I: Markets and consumer behaviour
The following are constraints on the optimal
acquisition of information by consumers:
Framing and information
The quality of information available to the
consumer is key. However, the importance of the
decision and the time the consumer will/will
not want to allot to the decision cannot be
underestimated. Markets with low levels of
clarity in information and time investment may
force consumers to make irrational or incorrect
decisions, or no decisions at all. Solutions in
such markets are unlikely to centre on more
information. Solutions may range from less
information to clearer information,
benchmarking and basic product design.
Problems are presented to consumer in 
two ways:
• Transparent: Choice behaviour does not
violate basic tenets of rationality.
• Opaque: People may well violate basic
principles.
Tests for transparency of information:
• How transparent/opaque is the information
presented to the consumer?
• In what environment does the consumer
make the decision?
• How much time does the consumer have to
make the decision?
• What other sources of information are
available to the consumer to make a
decision?
• What effect will a merger/behaviour have on
the transparency/opacity of information?
The structure of a problem 
The way in which a problem is presented to the
consumer may affect the choices made.
Prospect Theory tells us that the same problem
presented in different ways may influence the
decisions taken.
Tests:
• How many ways is the information in the
market presented?
• How uniform is the presentation of market
information?
• How much time will the consumer need to
invest before a decision is made and how
much gain will the consumer get from 
that decision? 
• How will the consumer make a cost-benefit
analysis in the market?
How consumers learn
Markets with limited learning opportunities
contain a number of incentives to abuse market
power and consumers (e.g. investment
managers making decisions whose effects will
not be uncovered for decades). While some
markets have limited opportunity for learning,
others try to limit learning for reasons of
control (e.g. many insurance and investment
products, travel agents). Consumers need
sufficient, clear information to learn. Solutions
in markets where this is not the case may
include information requirements and clear
updates on long-term decisions. 
Necessary feedback on decisions is often
lacking because: 
• Outcomes are delayed and not easily
attributable to a specific action.
• Variability in the environment degrades the
reliability of the feedback, especially where
outcomes of low probability are involved.
• There is no information about what the
outcome would have been if another decision
had been taken.
• Most important decisions are unique and
therefore provide little opportunity for
learning.
• Outcomes received with certainty are over-
weighted compared to outcomes that are
uncertain.
• Gains are treated differently to losses. Losses
generate a risk-seeking response while gains
produce a risk-adverse response. 
Tests:
Delay and variability
• How long does it take before a consumer
understands the effect of a consumption
decision? The obvious application here is
financial services (e.g. credit cards vs.
pensions). A rule of thumb: the longer the
time between decision and effect and
feedback, the weaker the potential for
effective competition.
• What is the transmission mechanism for
interpreting the decision-effect-feedback
loop? Who controls it?
• How easy is it to understand the
transmission mechanism and how accessible
is the information contained in it?
Uniqueness and alternatives
• How often is the consumer in the market?
• How many other decisions will the consumer
have made in the market?
• Do any accurate proxy measures exist in the
market for the consumer to rely upon?
Time and importance
• How important is the decision-effect-
feedback to the consumer?
• What other decisions-effect-feedback loops
will the consumer be dealing with during a
similar time frame?
• Will peer group pressure have any influence
on the seeking/acceptance of information?
• How are consumers likely to value the 
time needed to interpret the transmission
results?
Over-weighting certainty
• How certain is the relationship between
decision-effect-feedback? How much is the
consumption decision a bet (e.g. an
investment) and how much a certainty 
(e.g. a tin of beans);
• What is the consumer understanding of the
balance of probabilities in the market?
• How clear is the information in the market
about probabilities?
Gains and losses
• Is the product/service a bundle?
• How clear are the gains and losses in the
market?
• Do consumers have the opportunity to 
re-bundle gains and losses according to
preference?
Search costs 
Any difference in price between goods is seen
in relation to the total price of the goods. Thus
consumers will spend time searching for a
lower-priced television, but not for a tin of
beans. This has greatest implications for 
substitutability assessments and for the




• How important is this consumer decision
relative to the potential saving?
• What is the likely peer group view of the
gains from shopping around?
• What is the consumer understanding of the
market within which they are shopping?
• What are the physical bounds of the market?
• How long will a consumer normally shop
around for in this market?
• Are impediments placed in the way of a
consumer to limit the ability to find search
information?
• Do stores stock products that make
comparison shopping easier?
• How much of the market is migrating to 
the Internet, both in consumer and 
retailer terms?
Undermining the model of
rational consumers
Competition analysis is replete with indices
and mathematical calculations. These measures
all relate to the structural characteristics of the
market while tending to skate over the
elements that relate more directly to consumer
behaviour. Attempts to bring more cohesion to
understanding consumer behaviour in a market
are prone to the same difficulties seen in trying
to uncover strategic behaviour by companies.
Pointers and proxy measures are thus useful in
indicating certain patterns for assessing the
degree to which consumers will behave in a
classically rational manner. 
The factors outlined in the matrix discussed
below attempt to identify barriers to rationality.
Given the scale and identification of problems,
they can only be used as a rule-of-thumb guide
to assessing markets. The advantage of using
such rules-of-thumb rests primarily on the
ability to identify those individual barriers and
combinations of barriers, which will hamper
the effective operation of consumers in a
market. As such, they may help to frame
solutions or contribute to the assessment of
proposed policies.
Matrix of factors hindering consumer
rationality
Scale: 1=low, 2=medium, 3=high
How likely is it that consumers will 
maximise utility?
Length of time for the decision process to 
be made
Cost of search
The opportunity cost of the decision
Cost to revisit a decision
Cost to revise the decision
Sub-total for utility maximisation
How stable are consumer preferences 
likely to be?
Cost of getting decision wrong
Number of people involved in decision
Risk involved in the decision
Bundling of other products/services to choice
Sub-total for stable consumer preferences
How good will the information be?
Length of time post-decision to see effect
Volume of information required
Background information needs
Diversity of information presentation
Decision feedback time
Likelihood not in the market again
Likelihood not in related markets again
Likelihood proxy measures of performance 
not available
Sub-total for optimal information
Overall total
Likelihood that rational consumer model 
will not apply
When the rational model
does not apply
The matrix for assessing the degree to which the
rational consumer model applies can only act as
a guide in assessment of markets and possible
regulatory or market behaviour. The matrix
presents both structural and behavioural aspects
of markets. The object of regulators/market
participants should be to move the market
closer to the ideal type for consumer behaviour
to become more rational. This would produce
lower scores for each market.
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The matrix should also provide a useful tool for
assessing the likely effects of remedies in
competition cases. The question here will be the
degree to which a merger or a remedy in a
complex monopoly case or regulatory decision
increases or decreases the likelihood that
consumers will act in a rational manner.
While use of this matrix provides rule-of-
thumb assessments for factoring-in consumer
behaviour, this approach must be employed in
conjunction with other tools for competition
investigations. 
The role of the matrix will differ between
markets where direct sector-specific regulation
exists and markets where no such regulation
exists. In the former, it helps point to specific
remedies or structural/behavioural indicators.
In the latter, it helps identify the need to
address broader policy goals (e.g. information
provision or development of proxy
measurements) to allow information
transmission to work more effectively. 
Worked examples
The matrix of questions to be asked in a given
market is applied to a series of specific
examples below (see page 30). The markets
chosen range from complex, to vertically
integrated to relatively simple. The worked
examples test the relative application of 
the matrix. 
Totals represent the sum of each score; the
estimation of the applicability of the rational
consumer model reflects the degree to which
the total score relates to the 'worst case' market
(where all questions receive a 3 rating). In order
to maintain consistency in the application of
the scale, some questions are presented the
'wrong way round'. This keeps the scale and
rankings relatively unsullied. (Please note,
however, that a degree of bias in the estimation
of scale is unavoidable, particularly when it is
subjective.)
Part I: Markets and consumer behaviour
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Consumers and competition
Worked examples of rational consumer matrix
Ideal Pension Cars Holiday Tin of beans
market
How likely is it that consumers will 
maximise utility?
Length of time for the decision process to 
be made 1 3 2 2 1
Cost of search 1 3 3 2 1
The opportunity cost of the decision 1 2 2 2 1
Cost to revisit a decision 1 3 3 1 2
Cost to revise the decision 1 3 3 1 2
Sub-total for utility maximisation 5 14 13 8 7
How stable are consumer preferences 
likely to be?
Cost of getting decision wrong 1 3 3 2 1
Number of people involved in decision 1 2 2 2 1
Risk of the decision 1 3 2 3 1
Bundling of other products/services to choice 1 2 1 3 1
Sub-total for stable consumer preference 4 10 8 10 4
How good will the information be?
Length of time post-decision to see effect 1 3 1 2 1
Volume of information required 1 3 2 2 1
Background information needs 1 3 2 2 1
Diversity of information presentation 1 3 3 3 2
Decision feedback time 1 3 1 3 1
Likelihood not in the market again 1 3 2 2 1
Likelihood not in related markets again 1 2 1 2 1
Likelihood proxy measures of performance 
not available 1 2 1 3 1
Sub-total for optimal information 8 22 13 19 9
Overall total 17 46 34 37 20
Likelihood that model will not apply 90.20 66.67 72.55 39.22
Scale:  1=low   2=medium   3=high
Bounds: most likelihood that model will apply: 17
most likelihood that model will not apply: 51
Defining the relevant market is a
cornerstone of competition investigations.
Definitions have emerged from a learning
process based more on organic evolution
than on the development of hard and fast
rules. While this provides endless
opportunities for interpretation, it does
afford some degree of flexibility in the
system. We propose a set of additional
factors to be taken into account in the
definition of relevant markets. In the
geographic market analysis stage, we
advance a number of proxy measures
available to regulators to assess the degree
to which consumers define the geographic
bounds of their own markets. We also
propose a route to understanding the
potential impact of electronic commerce on
the operation of specific markets: that
regulators utilise market segmentation data
and consumer research work to identify the
likelihood of consumer groups transferring
their purchasing behaviour to online
marketplaces. 
Why bother?
Once the degree to which a consumer is likely
to behave in a classically rational manner has
been established, it is necessary to analyse the
extent of the market within which that
consumer will operate. Central to any
competition investigation is the definition of
the relevant market. One shorthand rule used
in monopoly cases in the US is that the relevant
market is the market that is capable of being
monopolised. Another, less circular, shorthand
method for assessing a market involves
answering the following question (referred to
as the ‘Hypothetical Monopolist Test’): 
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Part II: 
Defining the market
• Could a potential monopolist raise its price
in that market for a significant period of time
and hold it there?
Essentially, two elements are relevant to market
assessment:
• Geographic market definition
• Product market definition
Geographic market definition
Competition problems are commonly
assessed in a static manner and most
measures reflect this bias. We recommend
some changes to the spatial analysis of
relevant geographic markets to make them
relate more closely to the way in which
consumers behave.
Once the likely pattern of consumer behaviour
has been mapped, it is necessary to place that
consumer within a bounded market of some
description. Most consumption activity takes
place in a physical environment of some sort,
and this involves some form of bounds to a
market. To get a sense of how that market is
constrained, it is necessary to place the activity
of that market correctly within those bounds.
How it is currently done
The following key facts help to define the
geographic bounds of a market and reflect the
questions usually asked by competition
regulators in Europe.11
• Where is the product marketed?
• What is the geographic market into which
the product is sold?
• Is this defined by regulation?
• Is the geographic area contiguous with a
similar one?
• What are the physical barriers to entering
that geographic market?
• Where is the market under which
homogenous market effects can be found?
• Where are the conditions under which firms
operate fairly uniform?
To these questions, we can add:
• Is the market a service market or product
market? This is important because services
are less easily tradable on a cross-border
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analogous to the Central Business District. 
The size of the market within which the
consumer is willing or able to travel varies for
every product. One would assume (not always
correctly) that the more expensive the product,
the larger the concentric rings. This appears to
be borne out by two developments in retailing:
1) the situation of retail premises in many
countries; 2) the price-promises made by
retailers indicating the assumptions they make
about consumer shopping behaviour. The
Dixons Group, for example, offers two different
price-matching guarantees. Dixons stores
(which tend to be on high streets and in out-of-
town retail parks) offer a price-matching
guarantee for products brought within 10 miles
of a store. However, the PCWorld part of the
chain offers a price-matching commitment
within 30 miles of a store. 
Several methodological enhancements can 
aid consumer organisations in geographic
market definitions for competition
investigations:
Von Thunen Circles
Many consumer organisation seek to map
consumer behaviour through surveys which
identify the distances that consumers are
willing to travel to purchase certain goods.
Whether simple interview questionnaires or
more complex diary exercises, these surveys
can provide a useful indication of the
geographic market definition applicable in
competition cases. This can then be compared
to price-matching guarantees and similar work
carried out by firms operating in the market.
For example, in its recent work on new car
pricing, the UK Consumers’ Association
showed consumer willingness to travel up to 
50 miles to purchase a car. 
Internet market definition
The impact of the Internet as a force for
challenging existing models of competition is
more talked about than actually analysed.
However, geographic market definition
provides a useful rule-of-thumb that may allow
competition regulators to assess the potential
impact of the Internet on a market. 
As a first step, an investigation should ask 
two questions:
Consumers and competition
basis and are consumed on the spot. 
Services often require cultural specificity 
(e.g. advertising agencies operate within
culturally highly specified bounds where
concentration in a market is unlikely to spur
major entry by foreign firms). 
• What pattern of spatial distribution does
consumer purchasing follow?
• How does the consumer view the 
geographic market?
The end of geography?
Much has been made of the power of the
Internet and e-commerce to alter markets. In
terms of competition regulation, one of the key
impacts of the Internet will be on geographic
and product market definition. Almost by
definition, the Internet broadens the geography
of the market within which the consumer will
operate. Internet widens the potential realm of
consumer shopping from that which is
physically at hand to that which is possible by
courier. The Internet allows the consumer to
avoid the bounds of the physical location of
stores by providing almost unlimited access to
sites. However, the constraints placed on this
choice include customs duties and legal limits
as well as old-fashioned delivery problems. In
this sense, the Internet lies somewhere between
a real entrant and a potential entrant envisaged
by contestable market theory. 
Consumers define their own geographic
bounds to the marketplace through their
everyday consumption behaviour. A useful
analogy comes from the work of von Thunen in
economic geography. He developed a
deceptively simple theory of land allocation
based on an isolated town surrounded by
farmland. The allocation of that land would
depend on the value of the crop grown and the
relative cost of getting that crop to the town.
Von Thunen ended up with a now instantly
recognisable concentric rings model of land
allocation. This model was later adapted for
town planning purposes and lead to the
identification of the Central Business District
and suburbia. In many ways, consumers
operate a series of von Thunen circles for their
consumption decisions. 
The foundation for most consumption
decisions is the home, which can be viewed as
• To what degree does the existing retail
market correspond to the Pareto 80/20 rule
(e.g. what portion of the consumers in the
market account for what portion of profits)?
As a general rule, the greater the share of
profit accounted for by the smaller number 
of consumers, the greater the potential for
seemingly small-scale entry to have a
significant effect.
• If the market does display a loading toward
one small segment of the population, to what
extent is this population likely to migrate to
the Internet (or other technological
developments)?
The latter factor helps the regulator identify the
potential impact of the Internet on a retail
market. As a rule-of-thumb, it falls somewhere
between an analysis of the contestability and
the problem of anticipatory dominance. 
Matrix of key questions
To update the standard approach to geographic
market definition, we propose incorporation of
the following questions: 
Geographic market definition
• How big are von Thunen circles of
consumption?
• What areas do price-matching guarantees
cover?
• How does the Pareto Rule apply to this
market?
• Are Pareto consumers switching/likely 
to switch to the Internet?
Product market definition
With analysis of consumer behaviour a first
step and identification of geographic bounding
a second step, the definition of product-based
competition follows naturally as a third step in
the analysis of the effective operations of 
a market.
How it is currently done





On the demand side, two key tests to analyse




Substitutes are near products to the product 
in question. They are important because a 
price rise in one product will theoretically 
lead to consumers switching to substitute
products. 
There are a number of physical measures of
substitutability:
• Price elasticity of demand: Given a scarcity
of data, this textbook calculation is difficult
to operate in practice. The arrival of scanner
data in supermarkets makes calculation of
price elasticities of demand easier. The price
elasticity of demand is:
% change in demand
% change in price
The higher the figure, the greater the degree 
of price elasticity and substitutability. While 
a low ratio will indicate either low substi-
tutability or market power, it is not clear 
simply from this measure which one you are
dealing with.
• Cross-elasticities of demand: The degree to
which a price change in one product will
lead to a demand change in another
• Chain of substitution: A broad range of
products that would not normally be seen as
substitutes (e.g. Rolls Royce vs. Skoda) but
where a price change in one has a knock-on
effect on its nearest substitute, leading to a
change in prices down the substitution chain.
The justification for supply chains is weak
and is often used to excuse abusive
behaviour. However, chains can operate
within sub-markets (e.g. quality
newspapers/mid-market/tabloid). The
degree to which a chain exists is largely
determined by the degree to which the
consumer recognises the chain.
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• Innovation: Is this a market in which:
– new substitutes are being created 
(e.g. Playstation II for Dreamcast)? 
– new substitutes are likely to be created 
(e.g. WAP for Internet)?
If the answer is yes, the ability of a firm to
leverage market power is restrained and may
ebb by the time regulatory processes have
trundled into action.
Other important characteristics to be taken 
into account include:  
• Physical characteristics of products, as
characterised by: physically substitutable
(e.g. Mac vs. Windows software) including
path dependency (a situation where a choice
of technological path determines the sort of
complementary products that will flourish
e.g. Mac, Windows, VHS-Betamax, Qwerty
keyboards)
• Perceived-to-be substitutes, which view the
relevant comparative performance of the
product (difficult to assess); service substi-
tutability, which is even more difficult to
measure than product substitutability (e.g. 
in airlines, financial services, burgers, etc.)
• Price spreads: What is the range of prices
seen for this product range? (e.g. are the top-
10 Playstation games (c£35) substitutes for
each other? What effects do discounted older
Platinum games (c£20) have on the relevant
market)?
• Intended use: What will the consumer use
the product for? (e.g. in India, many top-
loading washing machines were purchased
to make Lhassi.)
• Income elasticity of demand: Similar to price
elasticity of demand. Will demand for the
product change relative to consumer
incomes/perceived consumer incomes
(consumer confidence regarding vacations,
hotel rooms, car purchases, etc.) The
calculation here is:
% change in demand
% change in income
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• Structural issues: How easy is it for
consumers to actually substitute between
different products? This question often
focuses attention on distribution
mechanisms. Key aspects include the
physical manner of sale (e.g. size of shop,
nature of sales process (catalogue/retail),
presence of tight selective and exclusive
distribution, SED) and the way the 
product is distributed (e.g. SED, niche
market).
• Company intention: Are firms marketing
products as substitutes or is a firm trying to
market a product as a substitute for a
product it currently is not a substitute for?
(e.g. the attempt in the 1990s by Volvo to
reposition itself as a competitor for BMW.)
What’s needed: Time in 
substitutability assessments
While the need to take account of spatial
factors has been addressed with some
success, treatment of time in competition
investigations has been less successful. In
this section, we propose indicators to help
regulators take better account of consumer
valuation of time in investigations.
Collection of some basic market data,
combined with some relatively straightfor-
ward consumer research, will illuminate the
role of time in the issue of substitutability.
The aim of the indicators is to highlight 
the likelihood that consumers will 
substitute products and to identify limits
that factors in the market will place on that
likelihood.
A particularly important element of any substi-
tutability assessment is the issue of time. Over
what sort of time period should behaviour be
assessed? This question is enormously
important in markets based on high technology
products and services. When assessing how
long the hypothetical monopolist is able to
raise prices, the question has to be asked: 
“How long is ‘how long’?” 
The answer must comprise the following
assessments:
Consumers and competition
• What is the current pattern of consumer
behaviour in the market? This must include
assessment of its cultural characteristics (e.g.
Japanese consumer electronics market)
• How quickly has this market responded in
the past to changes in service/product
provision? What is the division of consumers
in this market? How many are early
adopters? gradual adopters? late adopters?
• How important are early adopters? 
– Will they drive down later prices for later
adopters?
– Is their number sufficient to ensure
successful launch of products?
– Are consumers serial early adopters,
wherein the adoption of one new product
will quickly be followed by adoption of
another (e.g. as in the effect of potential
launch of Playstation II on Dreamcast sales).
– How much product loyalty is there in the
market? (e.g. impact of Sony Playstation on
Nintendo and Sega).
• The essential question to be addressed is:
Does the consumer behaviour in question
involve changes over time that seem out-of-
kilter with existing patterns of behaviour in
the market? 12
Time
• What is the consumer valuation of time in
this market?
– Is the market in question important to the
consumer? (e.g. car purchase, house
purchase)
– How quickly can the consumer grasp the
basic information needed to make a
decision? (e.g. car performance vs. 
pension performance)
– How quickly can the consumer undertake
the process to carry that decision through?
(e.g. car purchase vs. pension purchase)
– Is this time period artificially inflated as a
barrier to entry? (e.g. financial services)
• How long will it take consumers to assess the
substitutes on offer?
– What is the process by which consumers
become aware of substitutes (e.g.
advertising/leaflets)
– What is the existing pattern of information
in the market? (e.g. visual, verbal, leaflet,
poster, performance based)
– What opportunities are afforded to
consumers to allow them to gather
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information on the performance of
products/services?
• How long does this process take relative to
the likely valuation of time by the consumer?
Consumers value time relative to the expected
gain from the decision.
Working time into assessments
The matrix of questions aimed at identifying
the degree to which consumers will behave in
the classically rational model of behaviour
includes a number of measures to take time
into account in competition investigations.
However, there appears to be a need for a more
targeted means of assessing the potential role of
time in the process of substitution. Such a
measure combines market data with a
subjective ranking (which can be based on a
real figure) and weighted according to the
degree to which a decision is likely to be
directed or constrained by competing
distribution channels. 
The key measures are:
• Number of competitors in the market. This
indicator can be easily drawn from a simple
head count of players in the market, limited
by the geographic market definition carried
out previously. 
• Number of competitors that the consumer is
aware of. This measure can be ascertained
through opinion polls conducted to ascertain
the awareness of consumers to players in a
market. Another method is to conduct the
Von Thunen circle analysis to indicate the
number of firms a consumer has physical
access to. This would indicate the number of
firms from which a consumer can actually
choose.
• Time required to understand the
information provided. This figure can be
ascertained from a simple reading of the
information necessary to understand the
product or service concerned. In a pension
decision, for example, one can simply take
the documents provided as part of the sales
process and log the time needed to read and
understand. Similarly, in the purchase of a
car, one can measure the time needed to read
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documentation, carry out a test drive and
read a magazine review. While the accuracy
and uniformity of this information will differ
by market and is subject to some degree of
subjectivity, it provides an indication of the
amount of work a consumer will have to put
into a market prior to purchase.
• Importance of potential savings. The scale
measure used to indicate the importance of a
saving can be based on calculation. For
example, one could calculate the size of the
price spread within a market as a percentage
of the average price of the product (e.g. a 4
oz burger may differ in price by 2 pence on a
total spend of £1, whereas the price spread
on a pension may run into hundreds of
pounds on a spend of thousands). This
measure would indicate the degree to which
'shopping around' would be worthwhile.
However, such a measure would probably
have to be supplemented by a calculation of
the share of the average price of the
product/service as a percentage of average
disposable income. Thus, the relative price
spread for a car may be low in percentage
terms, whereas the actual value of the price
difference as a share of disposable income
may be high.
• Degree of vertical integration. The
weighting factor tacked on as the last
question to be asked is based on the
assumption that vertical integration tends to
increase the time taken to substitute
products. For example, a consumer wishing
to shop around for a hatchback car, cannot
visit one site to access all models. He or she
has to visit a number of geographically
dispersed sites to view vehicles produced by
many manufacturers, which increases the
time needed to make decisions. If one is
looking for a certain shade of lipstick, the
control that cosmetics houses have over their
distribution requires the consumer to visit
different stands within an 'official' retailer
rather than view all product categories in one
place. We have thus chosen to weight the
existence of the vertical integration as a
multiplier of the time required to make a
decision.
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The relationship between the factors
The overall figure is arrived at by multiplying
the number of competitors the consumer is
aware of by the amount of time required to
understand the necessary information provided
by each company. This is then multiplied by the
importance of the decision to the consumer and
then multiplied by the weighting factor of the
existence of vertical integration. 
The original figure, which indicates the number
of actual competitors in the market, is a useful
starting point from which to assess the known
number for consumers. A calculation based on
the awareness of competitors as a share of total
firms in the market is also useful. For example,
in a market with many hundreds of potential
suppliers, the number of those firms that
consumers are aware of is an important piece of
information in itself. In markets where large
numbers of firms operate but few are able to
reach consumers, one tends to find proxies
operating for consumers. This is the case in the
financial services industry, for example. In such
markets consumers tend to base their decisions
on proxy measures or proxy firms. Consumers
will tend to rely on branding as an indication of
performance or on intermediaries who can
guide them through the choices available. 
Demand-side 
complementarities
This assessment involves looking at
products/services related to the product in
question (e.g. bread/butter, CD players/CDs,
game consoles/games) where an increase in
price in one adversely affects demand for the
Consumers and competition
Consumer evaluation of time
How many competitors are there Number
in the market?
How many competitors is the Number
consumer aware of in the market?
How much time does it take to Hours
understand information provided?
How important will a saving be? Scale of 1-3
Is sales process vertically 2=yes, 1=no
integrated?
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Worked example: Consumer evaluation of time
Consumer evaluation of time Pension Cars Vacation Tin of beans
How many competitors are there in the market? Number 100 40 8 6
How many competitors is the consumer aware 
of in the market? Number 50 20 4 2
How much time does it take to understand 
information provided ? Hours 1 1 3 0.01
How important will a saving be? Scale 1-3 3 3 2 1
Is sales process vertically integrated? 2=yes, 1=no 2 2 2 1
Scale 33.33 13.33 12.00 0.02
complementary product. (e.g. the increase in
the price of petrol may have an effect on the
demand for cars that consume large amounts 
of petrol). The key questions in this 
estimation include:
• Are the products physically complementary?
(e.g. cars and petrol, CD players and CDs)
• Are the products/services perceived by
consumers to be complementary? (e.g.
TV/phone/Internet bundles)




The issue of supply side substitution relates to
whether a small increase in price would induce
a new firm (operator) to enter the market, thus
deterring the incumbent from raising its price.
For example, if a firm produces work boots and
notices that a firm is hiking prices in walking
boots, it may enter the market relatively easily
as it already produces a similar product. The
key elements of the supply side substitutability
assessment relate to:
• Is the product/service made with similar
technology that other producers/service
suppliers have access to?
• Is the product/service a complementary
product to one already made? For example,
is the product made alongside others (e.g. jet
fuel) for which costs are shared in the
production? 
The issue of supply side substitutability raises
three important issues:
• How easy is it for a firm to switch
production into the different/associated
product?
• How quickly can that firm switch
production?
• How willing will a firm be to enter that
market?
The answers to these questions raise important
issues we will address later. In particular, the
supply side substitutability raises issues
relating to:
• Contestability
• Barriers to entry (both real and perceived,
domestic and foreign)
• Sunk costs
• Reaction time of incumbents







Competition regulators have developed a
number of tools to help them to weigh the
relative size and strength of competitors in
any given market. This section discusses the
relative merits and demerits of each scheme
and supplements the more accepted tools
with less often used indicators of market
dynamism. It looks at means of
incorporating the possible impact of external
trade on market share calculations, defines a
series of potential scenarios (vertically
integrated, large number of small players
and small number of large players) and
assesses the potential impact of each on
standards in worked examples.
How it is currently done
Once you have a sense of how the consumer
behaves, what the market is and what sort of
mechanisms operates within it, you must gauge
how market power is distributed within that
market. The most straightforward way to do
this is with market share calculations. There 




Volume data is often the fall-back position for
consumer associations simply because it is
more easily available than value data.
However, it is definitely a second-best solution
and is best employed in conjunction with value
data, for the following two reasons:
• Volume data can mask the nature of the
market. A firm may have 30% of the volume
of business but only 10 % of the value of the
market. This information is vital in assessing
a merger.
• Volume data can give false readings of
market share:
– they are more easily manipulated to give
the appearance of sales where none exist
(e.g. pre-registered cars); 
– they can hide stocks at retailers and thus the
real pattern of purchasing by consumers.
– Volume data presents particular problems
in vertically integrated firms.
Volume data is a useful addition to value data
but it should be used in isolation only where:
• Value data is not present.
• Products/services in question are basically
identical (e.g. passenger numbers on airlines).
Here value/volume data should look similar.
Doing the sums




The concentration ratio is the most straightfor-
ward. It simply involves adding together the
market shares of (CR) the top 4, 6, 8, 10, firms.
Usually firm market shares are summed to the
top 4, 5 or 10.
Assuming a market with seven firms, one can
see from the table below that the sum of the
market shares of the top four firms leads to a
CR4 figure of 80%. This means that the top four
firms have 80 % of the market in question.
Market share % CR4
Firm A 35 35
Firm B 25 60
Firm C 10 70





Baldwin (14) has developed a useful estimation
of a series of market definitions based on the
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CR4 measure. They are:
• Highly concentrated oligopoly (75-100)
• Moderately concentrated oligopoly (50-74.9)
• Slightly concentrated (or low-grade)
oligopoly (25-49.9)
• Atomism (0-24.9)
The main drawback with the CR4 share is that
it fails to:
• Inject any dynamism into the calculation
(unless time series data are used);
• Ignores the remainder of the market.
A partial solution to this problem lies in the use




Both indices involve calculations of market
share based on the squaring of a market share
for each firm and a summing of that squared
market share to cover the entire market. Where
they differ is essentially in where the decimal
point goes. The Herfindahl Index uses figures
that sum to 1 and the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index uses percentages that sum to 100. Both
indices have the advantage over a
concentration ratio in that they sum the total
market, not just a subset. Importantly, the HHI
also gives greater weight to the market shares
of those firms with larger market shares, a
situation that more correctly reflects the greater
market power afforded to such firms. 
The Herfindahl Index has one major advantage
over the more commonly used Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index – a derivative of the HI can
give a snapshot of the number of effective
competitors in a market at any given time. 
Column 1 Col 2 Col 3 Col 4
Herfindahl Index Market share HI HI A+B HI E+F
Firm A 0.35 0.1225 0.36 0.1225
Firm B 0.25 0.0625 0.0625
Firm C 0.1 0.01 0.01 0.01
Firm D 0.1 0.01 0.01 0.01
Firm E 0.1 0.01 0.01 0.0225
Firm F 0.05 0.0025 0.0025
Firm G 0.05 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025
Total 1 0.22 0.395 0.23
No. of effective competitors 4.5 2.5 4.3
This is useful in merger assessments as it
indicates the potential competitive loss from an
agreement. As always, the indices are best
shown in tabular form. In all tables, the first
column indicates the current market shares of
each firm in the market (A-G). Column 2 shows
the initial Index measure and the sum of that
index. Column 3 shows the potential effect of a
hypothetical merger of firms A and B. Column
4 shows the potential effect of a hypothetical
merger between firms E and F. 
While the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index shows
the same result in terms of the total effect on
competition, the Herfindahl Index gives a
useful measure of effective competition. The
measure of effective competition is arrived at
by inverting the final measure of concentration
(the Total line); that is, by running the
calculation as one over the sum:
No. of effective competitors = 1/0.22 = 4.5
In the example below (based on our
hypothetical market), the first merger
effectively reduces the number of firms in the
market by two (despite actually only removing
one) and the second merger only involves the
effective loss of 0.2 of a competitor. Any
regulator or consumer activist would thus be
worried about merger 1 but not merger 2.
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is the more
regularly used of the two indices (see page 40).
The HHI is arrived at by summing the squares of
market shares (expressed in percentage terms).
The HHI can reach a maximum of 10,000 (100x
100) for a monopolist. The advantage of the HHI
is that it gives a usable index figure and allows
for an assessment of the increase in concentration
caused by a particular merger proposal. 
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Herfindahl Hirschman Index Market share HHI HHI A+B HHI E+F
Firm A 35 1225 3600 1225
Firm B 25 625 625
Firm C 10 100 100 100
Firm D 10 100 100 100
Firm E 10 100 100 225
Firm F 5 25 25
Firm G 5 25 25 25
Total 100 2200 3950 2300
If one uses our hypothetical market again, one
can see that the market starts with an HHI of
2200. The increase in concentration caused by the
merger of firms A and B is 1,750 (a very large
increase in concentration), while that for firms E
and F is relatively small, at 100 points. 
The 1992 Federal Trade Commission Horizontal
Merger Guidelines (amended in 1997 with new
section on efficiency defences) established a
useful set of rules-of-thumb for assessing
changes in concentration in merger cases using
the HHI (13). To quote Section 1.51 General
Standards in full:
In evaluating horizontal mergers, the Agency
will consider both the post-merger market
concentration and the increase in concentration
resulting from the merger. Market
concentration is a useful indicator of the likely
potential competitive effect of a merger. The
general standards for horizontal mergers are 
as follows: 
a) Post-Merger HHI below 1000. The Agency
regards markets in this region to be
unconcentrated. Mergers resulting in
unconcentrated markets are unlikely to have
adverse competitive effects and ordinarily
require no further analysis. 
b) Post-Merger HHI between 1000 and 1800.
The Agency regards markets in this region to
be moderately concentrated. Mergers
producing an increase in the HHI of less than
100 points in moderately concentrated markets
post-merger are unlikely to have adverse
competitive consequences and ordinarily
require no further analysis. Mergers producing
an increase in the HHI of more than 100 points
in moderately concentrated markets post-
merger potentially raise significant competitive
concerns depending on the factors set forth in
Sections 2-5 of the Guidelines. 
c) Post-Merger HHI above 1800. The Agency
regards markets in this region to be highly
concentrated. Mergers producing an increase in
the HHI of less than 50 points, even in highly
concentrated markets post-merger, are unlikely
to have adverse competitive consequences and
ordinarily require no further analysis. Mergers
producing an increase in the HHI of more than
50 points in highly concentrated markets post-
merger potentially raise significant competitive
concerns, depending on the factors set forth in
Sections 2-5 of the Guidelines. Where the post-
merger HHI exceeds 1800, it will be presumed
that mergers producing an increase in the HHI
of more than 100 points are likely to create or
enhance market power or facilitate its exercise.
The presumption may be overcome by a
showing that factors set forth in Sections 2-5 of
the Guidelines make it unlikely that the merger
will create or enhance market power or
facilitate its exercise, in light of market
concentration and market shares.
The guidelines developed by the FTC are a
useful starting point for assessments of mergers
and of possible accruals of market power.
Step down differences
between market shares
Of equal importance in any market share
calculation is the assessment of the differences
between market share of incumbents. Thus if a
market has one or two very large competitors
and a large number of very small competitors
(as does our hypothetical market, above), the
manner of operation of that market will be
significantly affected by restraints on
competition. The relative size of the second
string competitor is important. The differences
in market share can be easily modelled. 
One can:
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• sum the Herfindahl or Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index for the second order
competitors;
• calculate the marginal-concentration ratio of
the second group of four firms;
• calculate the size of the second group of four
firms to the first group of four firms.
Health warning I: It should be noted that these
data are only really useful on either a:
• significant time series basis: 10 years of data
are always a useful starting point
• comparative basis, either across industries,
markets or countries.
Health warning II: These data on relative
concentration need to be treated with caution
when used in comparative mode and on a time
series basis. Evidence of an increase in
concentration/widening of gap is evidence of
nothing in isolation from an understanding of
the dynamics of the specific market and of
markets being used in comparison.
Temporal aspects to
concentration
One of the key drawbacks to an index-based
approach to measuring market power is the
fact that such measures tend to be ‘snapshot’
measures and lack a dynamism that would
help to explain a market. This can be solved by
using time series data. Such data would include
a number of years’ worth of market share data
(with all firms involved at each stage of the
market’s evolution.) The key advantage to such
a calculation is that it allows for a more fluid
analysis of the market and a better
understanding of the degree of turnover in 
a market, and thus the likelihood of entry 
and exit. 
What’s needed: Impact of
external trade 
There is a real problem in dealing with cross-
border trade in goods in measures of market
power and market share. When looking at
trade data, we must ask:
• Is the trade registered as trade between parts
of a firm or independent operators?
• Is the import purchase market oligopolised
or monopolised? (with gains from trade
captured by intermediaries)
• What is the pattern of market structure in the
exporting country? Is the exported good:
– exported by an export cartel? (e.g. Voluntary
Export Restraint on Japanese vehicles)
– exported by a very large number of very
small producers? (e.g. leather goods)
– produced under contract by importing
firms?
• What are the regulations governing the
traded goods?
– Do they have a high ad valorem tariff?
– Are there quantitative restrictions on the
import of the good?
– Do other regulations effect the cost of 
the goods?
All these factors must be taken into account
before injecting an assessment of trade into a
market share calculation. In doing so, a number
of scenarios exist to factor in the potential
market share of trade. The following options
are available:
• Vertically integrated trade: This should be
reflected in the existing market share data
and will have no effect on the share allocated
to firms already operating there. For
example, if the UK imports 30% of its
petroleum through existing vertically
integrated operations, the effect on market
share is zero because of the vertical nature of
the firms in question. 
– Competitive effect – very small
– Competitive threat (for contestability
assessments) – very small/zero
• Independent trade from a large number of
small exporters: The effect on existing market
share is likely to be small as exporters into the
market are unlikely to accrue a good deal of
market power. For example, one can look at
the import share of independently produced
toys and shoes from developing countries as a
share of total imports in those sectors.
– Competitive effect – very small
– Competitive threat (for contestability
assessments) – very small/potentially
medium
• Independent trade from a small number of
large exporters: Depending on the number of
exporters, this can be dealt with as a normal
market share calculation. It is, however,
necessary to understand how exporters feed
their products into the market: is it a stand
alone strategy? does it involve intermediaries
(in which case the competitive effect is
absorbed by others)? does it involve
franchising/licensing (again transferring/
absorbing the market effect by others)? One
can look at the purchase of petrol on the spot
market by supermarket retailers as a market
where a small number of importers purchase
exported oil. Here the competitive calculation
rests on sales of petrol by supermarkets, not
by exporters into the UK
– Competitive effect – medium – subject to
mediation/capture
– Competitive threat – medium – can be
leveraged into significant scale under
certain circumstances.
Let us return to our example of the theoretical
market (seven players, highly concentrated). If
we introduce the three possible trade impacts
(vertically controlled, small exporters, large
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exporters), we can see the effect that an
alteration in methodology can bring about. 
In example one (above), we have redistributed
5% each from Firm A and B to import
competition and re-run the scenarios. The initial
reallocation of market share has significantly
reduced the pre-merger HHI. However, because
the number of exporters into the market are
large and their individual market shares are
small, the potential constraining effect of these
players on the post merger A+B is very small
and the likelihood of the exporters affecting this
market is low.
If, however, one redistributes the market share
taken by the multitude of smaller exporters and
allocates it to a single exporter (below), the
degree of concentration increase significantly.
But one is also potentially limiting the impact
of any mergers in second order firms.
Problems with indices
Concentration measures pose a number of
problems but these should not be overstated.
Consumers and competition
Large number of small independent traders
Herfindahl Hirschman Index Market share HHI HHI A+B HHI E+F
Firm A 30 900 2500 900
Firm B 20 400 400
Firm C 10 100 100 100
Firm D 10 100 100 100
Firm E 10 100 100 225
Firm F 5 25 25
Firm G 5 25 25 25
Import agents 10 1 1 1
Total 100 1651 2851 1751
Single independent exporter into market
Independent trade/one supplier
Herfindahl Hirschman Index Market share HHI HHI A+B HHI E+F
Firm A 30 900 2500 900
Firm B 20 400 400
Firm C 10 100 100 100
Firm D 10 100 100 100
Firm E 10 100 100 225
Firm F 5 25 25
Firm G 5 25 25 25
Import agents 10 100 100 100
Total 100 1750 2950 1850
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The drawbacks to the use of indices have more
to do with their possible abuse rather than their
intrinsic utility. As with all indicators, the indices
and concentration measures should never be
stretched beyond their breaking point in terms
of their explanatory powers. A concentration
measure on its own proves little and should
always be used in conjunction with more work
on the operation and nature of the market. 
• The measure is largely static.
• The measure assumes that a post-merger firm
will have the same market share as the sum
of its parts does prior to merger.
• The measure of concentration presumes a
link between greater concentration and a loss





The importance of vertical restraints on
trade has waxed and waned in the post-war
regulatory world. The pattern of lenience
toward vertical restraints seen throughout
the 1980s and ‘90s seems to be fading.
Consumer organisations have long taken
the view that the anti-competitive effects 
of vertical restraints have been
underestimated. For consumers, one of the
defining problems for regulation of the 'new
economy' rests on a more sceptical view of
the operation of vertical restraints across
currently diverse markets. We propose 
that regulators should dust off the
methodologies developed (but repudiated)
in the US and apply them rigorously in
competition cases.
How it is currently done
Vertical integration is increasingly being seen
by regulators in a relatively benign light. The
recent European Commission reforms to the
rules on vertical restraints have set the
following twofold definition.
1. Vertical restraints in a firm with less than
30% market share will be presumed not to be
harmful, unless;
2. More than 50 % of an industry operates the
same pattern of vertical restraint.
This combines the ‘market share’ test with 
the ‘network’ effect test and is remarkably
similar to efforts in the US to deal with the




The US developed a series of guidelines for
assessing vertical restraints on a similar basis to
the horizontal merger guidelines. However,
these were repudiated under the Bush
administration and failed to make a comeback
in the Clinton administration. The repudiated
guidelines were nonetheless extremely useful in
outlining the consensus view of how to deal
with vertical restraints under competition law.
The view enunciated in the guidelines was
positive about the potential benefits of vertical
restraints.
The relationship between vertical restraints and
collusion were neatly bounded by the
guidelines by placing upper and lower limits
on the likelihood that collusion would arise
from vertical restraints. The guidelines stated
that vertical restraints were unlikely to aid
collusion unless three conditions were found: 
• concentration is high in the primary market; 
• firms in the secondary market using the
restraint, account for a large portion of sales
in that market; and 
• entry into the primary market is difficult.
Conversely, for exclusive dealing to lead to
anti-competitive exclusion, the following
market conditions must normally be found: 
• the ‘non-foreclosed market’ is concentrated
and leading firms in the market use the
restraint; 
• firms subject to the restraint control a large
share of the ‘foreclosed market’; and 
• entry into the "foreclosed market" is difficult.’
The two stage process
Stage one
The US Department of Justice (DoJ) guidelines
followed a two-stage process that involved
‘screening’ a market for likely problems caused
by vertical restraints and then applying a more
rigorous approach to those that did indicate a
problem. In stage one, the DoJ was to apply the
market structure screen aimed at excluding the
following circumstances:
• the firm employing the restraint has a share
of the relevant market of 10 % or less; or 
• the Vertical Restraints Index (VRI) is under
1,200 and the coverage ratio is below 60 % in
the same (e.g. supplier or dealer) relevant
market; or 
• the VRI is under 1,200 in both relevant
markets;
• the coverage ratio is below 60 % in both
relevant markets. 
Vertical Restraints Index and the
Coverage Ratio
The Vertical Restraints Index is the vertical
counterpart of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
and was developed in the guidelines as a
similar rule-of-thumb system. With the
repudiation of the guidelines, the VRI died as a
tool of analysis for the DoJ. However, the tool
itself is quite useful and there is no reason why
it cannot be applied in competition
investigations involving vertical restraints. 
To quote from the guidelines:
The Vertical Restraints Index (VRI) is calculated
by squaring the market share of each firm in
the market that is a party to a contract or other
arrangement that contains the vertical restraint
and then summing the values obtained for
firms at the same level of operations. 
For example, if only two firms in a dealer
market employ a restraint, one with a 5% and








+ 400 = 425 
If four suppliers, each with a 25% market 










= 625 + 625 + 625 + 625 =
2,500
If all firms in the relevant market use the
restraint, the VRI is equal to the HHI used in
merger analysis. The maximum possible value
of the VRI is 10,000, achieved when there is
only one firm in a market and that firm
employs a vertical restraint. The VRI reflects
both the distribution of the market shares of
firms using a vertical restraint and the extent to
which it is used in the relevant market.
In essence, the VRI is the HHI in that it
assumes that the vertical restraint employed by
a firm is uniform and comprehensive. Like the
mobility measurements outlined above, there is
nothing to stop analysts from applying the VRI
to different vertical restraints in a market and
assessing the likely impact. It would be
interesting to assess the partial application of a
vertical restraint using the VRI. For example, if
a jeans manufacturer has 25% of a market but
only operates a vertical restraint on 50% of
distribution, this would indicate a problem for
the VRI. The problem relates to intrabrand
competition (competition between suppliers of
a single brand). The problem arises because the
DoJ (and most other competition regulators)
have an ideological disposition to discount the
need to encourage intrabrand competition and
to concentrate instead on interbrand
competition (competition between suppliers of
different brands). 
The problem of dealing with the VRI on its
own was partially solved by tying it to the
Coverage Ratio. This involved looking at the
VRI for the companies in question and then
assessing the resultant figure in relation to the
Coverage Ratio. The Coverage Ratio was a
simple measure of the share of the market that
was covered by the same, or similar, vertical
restraint. Thus, if two firms with 25% of the
market each were merging and seeking to
apply the same vertical restraint, but they were
the only firms applying such a restraint, the
coverage ratio would be the same. However, if
two firms with 10% of the market each sought
to merge and apply the same vertical restraint,
but the remainder of the market also applied a
restraint, the coverage ratio would be equal to
100%. This would easily fail on the network test
applied by both the EU and the US.
The car market in Europe is a classic example
of where the application of the VRI and
Coverage Ratio would work. No one firm has
sufficient market share to overly worry anyone
under a VRI assessment. However, the
Coverage Ratio indicates that the entire market
is covered by the same restraint – a much
clearer indication of a problem. What is
interesting is the effect that any one merger or
alliance has on the application of the
VRI/Coverage Ratio.
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Stage two
If an agreement fails to pass muster under the
market structure screen, the market would
proceed to Stage Two. This stage involved what
the DoJ referred to as a ‘structured rule of
reason’ approach. This was a clear signal that
the DoJ were soft-pedalling on vertical restraints,
given the fear of business lobbyists that a ‘per se’
prohibition rule would be applied. The Stage
Two process involved a balance of benefits and
disbenefits from the vertical restraint in the
market. In a strange twist of fate, this approach
came perilously close to the operation of Article
81(3) under European competition law – where
an otherwise anti-competitive agreement could
be allowed, provided it met some fairly
anodyne, and rarely applied, criteria.
The key criteria to be applied in Stage Two
involved an assessment of:
• Barriers to entry in both the upstream and
downstream markets;
• Is the product homogenous or heterogeneous?
what is the nature of product competition? (in
the former, collusion is more likely)
• What is the history of collusion in the market?
• How exclusionary is the restraint? Is it an
exclusive supply agreement?
• Is there an indication of the intention of the
parties applying the restraint?
• Are the restraints being applied by small
firms or new entrants as a means of getting a
toehold in the market?
• Are there easily identifiable pro-competitive
efficiency gains from the restraint?
Tying
The DoJ also developed guidelines for the
analysis of tying agreements. This is an
agreement in which a supplier only supplies
one product in return for another product being
carried as well (e.g. only supply 501s if 602s are
sold as well). This can also be referred to as
‘full line forcing’. The judicial treatment of such
restraints has tended to be lenient (as with most
other vertical restraints). The DoJ guidelines
proposed that tying arrangements be subjected
to the following tests:
• Does the firm have market power? (e.g. over
30% of the market)







Simple snapshots of market power are
limited indicators of market structure. A key
weakness is the lack of dynamism in the
results that they arrive at. To more fully
capture the essence of a market, one has to
build in ideas of movement and innovation.
This can be done in a number of ways,
including basic measurements of mobility
within markets. The potential for other
players in the market exercising a form of
countervailing power must also be taken
into account. This section maps the major
tools available to take account of mobility
and countervailing power and highlights
issues involved in assessing technological
innovation in a market.
How it is currently done
Once the market under investigation and its
degree of concentration has been identified, it is
necessary to look at the factors that help to
define that market and the likelihood that the
market will change. In particular, one must
look at:
• sources of countervailing power
• technological innovation in the market
• threat of successful entry by new players
There is a definitional problem awaiting
competition analysts in looking at barriers to
entry in isolation. As we will see below,
barriers to entry can also be observed as
barriers to establishment. As John Baldwin 14
has noted: ‘Analysts in the field of industrial
organisation have often devoted special
attention to modelling the effect of entry.
Implicit in these exercises is the notion that the
disciplining influence exerted by entry is
different from internal pressures that come
from incumbent firms. If entry and exit are just
marginal manifestations of a general turnover
process at work, then there is little need to treat
them separately.’
What is probably more useful is to analyse
market mobility.
The relative stasis of concentration measures
has prompted many economists to argue that
concentration measures on their own do not
indicate industry mobility. If, as we argue
below, mobility is preferable to entry and exit
as a means of assessing markets, there must be
some means of assessing mobility. The problem
we face is access to data. Dependent on
availability of data, at least four approaches 
are possible to enable the measurement of
mobility:
• changes in market share between incumbents
• degree of change in market rankings
• extent to which market share for firms
regress to the mean market share
• extent of inter-group mobility.
Using the Dissimilarity Index, one can
calculate the redistribution of market share for
firms over a time period. The index can be used
in complex monopoly cases where long-run
trends are needed or where incumbents are
trying to indicate how much market share they
have lost to new entrants. The Index is
calculated by taking two years some distance
apart (e.g. 1999 and 1989). The market share of
each firm in the latest year is taken and the
market share in the first year is then subtracted
from that figure. The resulting figure is divided
by two. When all firms are included, the total
figure will vary between 0 and 100 and will
give an idea of how much movement there has
been in the distribution of market shares. The
Index can be further nuanced by extracting out
the market share changes attributable to new
entrants, exits and mergers.
Dissimilarity indices can also be adapted for
groups or sub-groups of firms. For example,
dissimilarity indices can be calculated for
groups of firms ranked according to size (a
dissimilarity index for CR4, CR5-8 etc). This
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downstream market power. The authors (16) of
this report argue that buyer power can be
manifested in the following forms:
Slotting allowances: These are payments, for
example, to a supermarket for the right to have
one’s goods on display in a particular place on
the shelves, or even to have them on display 
at all. 
Exclusive distribution: Exclusive or sole
distribution agreements can be used by
important buyers to extract concessions from
their suppliers. 
Conditional purchase behaviour: This is the
purchase of goods only on condition that
significant concessions are made by the
supplier of such goods. Two sub-cases spring to
mind. The first is where a purchaser gets into a
dominant position with a supplier such that the
purchaser’s business becomes of vital
importance to the supplier, at least in the short
to medium term ... The second sub-case is
where a purchaser will only buy on condition
that other outlets are not supplied with the
product, or not supplied with a precise version
of the product. 
Exclusivity contracts: …retailers …may
concern the desire to foreclose the market (and
thereby allow for higher downstream prices to
the potential benefit of both parties)…
Alternatively, the explanation may be in terms
of dealing with vertical externalities which
result from successive independent behaviour. 
Cloning behaviour: behaviour aimed at ‘free-
riding’ on the investment of established players
in the market 
Joint marketing: A powerful retail chain may
encourage a manufacturer to engage in a joint
promotion exercise whereby the manufacturer
offers concessions only to purchasers at a
particular store chain. 
Predatory buying of inputs: …it is conceivable
that a dominant buyer may seek to expand its
purchases, driving up factor prices to the point
where a rival is unable to continue suffering
losses, due to high costs, and so leaves the
market. 
Part V: Mitigating factors in assessments of market power
can be used to identify the degree of market
share reallocation within different groups 
of firms.
A further measure of mobility can be calculated
by dividing the ranked list of firms (by market
share) into quintiles (five groups) and assessing
the degree to which firms moved between
quintiles over a set period. This gives a
reasonably clear picture of firm growth/decline
in an industry and can aid the assessment of
market stasis or vibrancy.
Despite the relatively straightforward nature of
the dissimilarity index as a first step in the
measure of mobility, it is not frequently used in
competition investigations. This is a shame,
given the relative stasis of the HHI calculation.
Countervailing power
The study of markets at the end of the 20th
century made great play about the emergence of
countervailing powers in consumer product
markets. In particular, the strength of mass-
market retailers became a subject of much
analysis. In terms of understanding specific
markets, one has to ask the following questions:
• How many levels does the market operate
through? How many linked markets are
there between first producer and final
consumer? (While similar to the chain of sub-
stitutability, this focuses more on the chain of
production, distribution and consumption.)
• At what stage of the chain is the market
located? Is it upstream, downstream or
intermediate to other markets?
• What other players exist in the market at
other stages of the production, distribution
and consumption chain? What degree of
concentration exists at each stage of this
process?
Recent work on the emergence of
countervailing power is relatively slim.
However, one study for the OFT has provided a
potential checklist for practices in sectors where
retail countervailing power might exist. The
degree to which the following factors operate is
the degree to which upstream agglomerations
of market power may be counteracted by
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Strategic purchasing of facilities: Control of an
essential facility for distribution is a general
feature of privatised utilities. However, key
facilities for distribution arise in other
unregulated industries which may allow for
buyers to exercise power by controlling 
market access. 
Reciprocal dealing: Reciprocal dealing involves
a monopsonistic buyer of some product
agreeing to purchase from a specific seller on
condition that the seller also buys a product
from the buyer. 
Terms of business: …potential strategic
practices which accommodate rivals whereby
buyers act together to improve their mutual
position against their suppliers… a more likely
candidate for such behaviour would be
‘standard terms of business’ which, while not
being mutually agreed in any specific way,
nevertheless become broadly adopted as
industry practice and therefore tacitly agreed
between buyers.
Technological innovation
The issue of technological innovation is a
difficult one to map for competition analysis. 
In high technology markets, the lure of the
‘innovation’ defence is a major one when
attempting to accrue market power. One of the
major drawbacks in this field is that the
defence/analysis rests on an assessment of
future developments in a sector. As such, it is
prone to inaccuracy and crystal ball gazing. It is
also a market in which entry costs are very low
– one of the reasons that industry journalists
are prone to criticise competition regulators for
meddling in markets that they ‘do not
understand’. The criticism is often characterised
by the potential impact of the ‘next big thing’
and is usually wrong-headed. In analytical
terms, one must try to pin innovation in a
market down to some form of measurable
outcome. The following questions might help:
• Is the market a mature one? (e.g. cable TV)
• Is the market part of a wider market? (e.g.
cable telephony/Internet access)
• Is the market part of a wider market that is
converging in delivery and content?
• Is the market characterised by high R&D
spending? (need to be careful with this one)
• Is the market highly dependent on
intellectual property protection?
Issues of barriers to entry, establishment
and exit are of central importance to any
understanding of a market, as they are key
factors in turning a static market analysis
into a dynamic cognisance of the market
under analysis. Preferable to viewing market
entry on its own is analysis of the entry-
establishment-exit sequence as part of the
process of market mobility. This section
describes various studies of entry,
establishment and exit barriers and
suggests a way to calculate the impact of
such barriers on markets.
How it is currently done
One of the key concepts used in the recent
assessment of markets is the contestability
approach pioneered by Baumol, Panzar and
Willig (17) and adopted by a number of
regulatory agencies. The approach has been
used to undermine straightforward static
models of market concentration that simply
equate concentration with a lack of
competition. However, the contestability
approach itself has tended to be undermined
by the actual operation of markets and the
ability of incumbents to fend off competition.
Contestability essentially rests on the threat of
competition, rather than actual competition,
being a significant constraint on the abuse of
market power by incumbent firms. In essence,
incumbents will not utilise their market power
for fear of triggering market entry. While the
argument is fairly weak for the application of
contestability theory, the grounds on which it
can be applied are a useful test for a market.
The three conditions that have to be met for a
market to be deemed contestable are:
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• there are no barriers to entry or exit;
• all firms, both incumbent and potential
entrants, have access to the same production
technology and there is perfect information
on prices, available to all consumers and firms;
• entrants can enter and exit before
incumbents can adjust prices.
In reality, few markets fulfil this checklist but it
is a useful one to bear in mind when assessing
markets.
A useful model of market entry that takes
account of a large number of factors that firms
will take into account when assessing whether
or not to enter a market was carried out by John
Baldwin,(18). He argued that firms will normally
take into account the following factors:
• perceived post-entry profit: both existing
profit and a likely growth in profit
• barriers to entry: economies of scale,
concentration, advertising intensity and R&D
• market risk: the volatility of market growth
• number of firms and market size
• industry growth
To this list of factors one can add: 
• existence and size of sunk costs
• reaction time of incumbents
• nature of past incumbent firm behaviour
(reputation)
• existing market regulations
The shopping list of factors governing firm entry
strategy should be placed under three headings: 
• barriers to entry
• barriers to establishment
• barriers to exit
Barriers to entry
The study of barriers to entry is the best
developed of these areas. Barriers that a firm
may face include the following:
Pre-existing exclusive supply
contracts
Incumbent firms may already have access 
to supply contracts to firms or government.
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Such contracts can help to offset activities in
other sectors (effective subsidy) or entail a
sewing up of a significant part of the market.
An example of the former can be seen in the
relationship in the supply of military aircraft
between the US government and Boeing.
Tests:
• Is the market characterised by a small
number of large contracts?
• Is the government a big purchaser of goods?
Governmental regulations and
relationships
Incumbent firms have often been deeply
involved in the establishment of regulations
that govern their own behaviour. Such
regulations can be set at an artificially high
level in the knowledge that lower cost
operators will not be able to fund such costs.
There is thus an incentive on incumbents to
champion ever-higher technical and
performance standards as a means of 
deterring entry. 
On a similar tack, incumbent firms often have
well-established relationships with government
and regulators that makes the ability of new
entrants to operate in that market difficult. The
ability of British Airways to effectively have
UK international aviation policy written for its
sole benefit is a clear example of this form of
regulatory capture. 
Tests:
• Is the incumbent an ex or current national
champion?
• Are government regulations important in
shaping the market?
Vertical restraints
Tying relationships between existing suppliers
and manufacturers can make it difficult to enter
an established market. There are a large
number of potential vertical restraints that can
limit market entry. For example, the freezer
exclusivity issue still in published text was a
clear effort at restraining market entry.
Similarly, exclusivity links in the brewing
industry clearly acted as a barrier to entry.
Tests:
• Are vertical restraints a structural feature of
the market? 
• What is the rationale for the operation of
vertical restraints?
Access to essential facilities
The issue of essential facilities is complex and
controversial. An essential facility is a one that
is needed by a firm to enable it to carry out its
normal business activity. Such facilities can
include such things like ports, gas pipelines
and airport slots. In any industry in which
essential facilities are present, one has to
consider:
• Is access is provided at fair and reasonable
rates?
• Is capacity artificially restrained to limit
entry?
• Is redistribution of existing assets necessary
as a pre-requisite to market entry?
Economies of scale
In comparison to the more strategic factors
outlined above, the existence of scale
economies is relatively straightforward. Scale
economies occur when a firm, through the size
of its production, attains economic efficiencies
that allow it to undercut other firms. If an
incumbent firm has attained such economies,
the likelihood of successful entry by a new firm
is reduced. At the least, entry is only likely by
firms either with their own economies of scale
or with deep enough pockets to allow losses to
be attained in order to attain economies of scale
over time.
Tests: 
• Do incumbents possess economies of scale?
• Are any potential foreign competitors that
also possess economies of scale able to enter
the market ?
• Are there potential new entrants from other
industries with sufficiently deep pockets to
attain scale economies within a reasonable
period of time?
Concentration
An industry that is highly concentrated is likely
to act as a barrier to entry to a new firm.
However, this barrier is potentially overcome
by two factors, both strategically driven:
51
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Judo economics: this wonderfully named
theory that rightly points out that smaller firms
can be fleeter of foot than their larger
counterparts and so can gain market share, or
successful niches, relatively quickly.
Niche operation: to avoid undue attention
from competition regulators, entry may be
facilitated but constrained as a means of
showing good faith and behaviour. 
Advertising intensity
It is interesting to analyse advertising
expenditure in markets where significant entry
has not occurred and trace patterns relating
expenditure to the potential for entry.
Advertising expenditure can operate either as a
defensive move (protecting brand identity from
insurgence) or offensive (flooding newer
messages). 
Tests:
• How important is branding in the market?
• What role does advertising play in the
market?
R&D
Industries with high spending on R&D are
always difficult to break into. R&D expenditure
requires two things: innovation and deep
pockets.
A close look at recent developments in the
pharmaceutical industry bears this analysis out.
In the 1990s, the main source of innovation and
potential innovation came from biotechnology
companies seeking genetic therapies and
medicines. Such firms had access to significant
amounts of innovation and research. In
contrast, established pharmaceutical companies
had access to little biotechnological research
but plenty of money. When the former firms
found that their R&D was not leading to fast-
enough medical breakthroughs, they found that
pharmaceutical companies were only too eager
to offer their deep pockets as purchasers or
‘strategic allies’. 
Tests:
• Is this an industry that requires large
expenditures on R&D
• Are there potential new entrants with 
deep pockets?
Sunk costs
Sunk costs are those costs incurred in entering
a market that are irrecoverable on exit. If a firm
establishes a factory with specialist equipment,
it will not be able to sell this equipment on
exiting the industry. Sunk costs are important
because they are part of the fabric of an entry
decision but have already been factored into
costs by an incumbent. A difference in cost
bases is thus likely to occur. However, this can
be overstated because entry is usually presaged
on being a lower cost operator than an
incumbent. Sunk costs are also important
because they have an impact on potential
profitability and market risk. 
Tests:
• Does this industry require a large
irrecoverable cost? (e.g. cable telephony)
• Have incumbents shown a tendency to act
aggressively against new entrants?
• Have potential entrants indicated that they
possess deep pockets?
The summary calculation for the likelihood of
market entry has been summarised as:
Market entry = sum (market size+market
growth+expected post entry profit+barriers 
to entry+market risk)
Barriers to entry and market risk are both
disincentives and the former three incentives. 
Barriers to entry can be summed as the barriers
listed above but are more usually summed as:
economies of scale+market concentration+
advertising intensity+R&D costs.
Expected post-entry profit is modelled usually
as the average profit of the sector expecting
entry. However, it can also be modelled by the
firm as the variance between pre-entry profit
and expected post-entry profit. 
The market risk is usually modelled by the
volatility in market growth.
52
Identification of strategic behaviour by firms
is the most theoretically dense element of
our work. The evolution of thinking about
firm behaviour owes a good deal to
developments in game theory and
mathematical modelling and is thus
complex. The importance of reputation and
information cannot be digested at one
sitting. This section looks at existing
research and places it within the framework
of a possible investigation, suggesting a
framework for thinking and a set of targeted
questions to help identify key problems 
and approaches.
How it is currently done 
Strategic behaviour of firms is at the heart of
competition law and policy and has been a
driving force behind changes in the nature of
that law. However, the manner in which a
legal/economic system of regulation can 
assess strategic behaviour is less clear, except 
in specific cases of laws aimed at excesses of
such activities. For example, the Robinson-
Patman Act (US) is specifically aimed at
restraining price discrimination by suppliers 
if this discrimination is aimed at restricting
competition. Similarly the treatment of
predatory behaviour has a specific beha
vioural aspect to the law, in its assessment 
of intent. 
While the focus on intent provides a way in for
the study of strategic behaviour, the real ability
of regulators to separate Type I from Type II
errors (see below) is limited by the ‘fog of war’




It should be noted in dealing with real
industries that the existence of structural
barriers may well deter entry to the market in
terms of number and frequency. However, it is
unlikely to affect the size of the likely entrant
negatively. If anything, structural barriers make
the entry of larger firms more likely than small
ones. There is also limited evidence that the
likelihood of market entry is determined by the
profitability of the smaller players in the
market. This is simply because it is likely that
any new entrant would enter the market as a
small player. This is an important practical
issue when assessing the likelihood of 
market entry.
Barriers to establishment
The key problem with looking at barriers to
establishment is separating out the normal cut
and thrust of competitive behaviour from the
clearly anti-competitive behaviour or abuse of 
a dominant position. The following rules of
thumb are useful:
• If the market is composed of a small number
of relatively evenly divided firms, evidence
of collusion should be looked for. This
includes:
– outright collusion/cartelisation
– tacit collusion/ unwillingness to compete
• If the market has a dominant player, one
needs to look for abuse of that position. This
can take many forms, many of which are
included above in the outline of barriers to
entry. Specifically one can identify:
– strategic behaviour, and particularly
predatory behaviour 
– tilting the playing field
– market foreclosure
• If the market has a large number of small
suppliers, collusion is less likely. (Cartels
generally rely on few members with a




Part VII: Strategic behaviour
When faced with the potential entry of a
competitor into a market, an incumbent firm
has a number of options. The two central
choices are to fight all entrants or accommodate
them (see the ‘chain store paradox’, below).
However, Jean Tirole and Drew Fudenberg
have identified a four-fold typology of firms
and likely response (19) in a study of
investment in R&D and advertising as a
response to threatened entry or expansion.
The key findings of the Fudenberg and Tirole
model are as follows:
• Lean and Hungry: An incumbent may reduce
advertising to deter entry by signalling to a
competitor that it has reduced its ‘goodwill’
in the market with consumers and is
prepared to fight on price.
• Fat-Cat Effect: An incumbent may
accommodate market entry but over-invest in
advertising as a means of softening up the
new entrants pricing behaviour and relaxing
investment post-entry.
• Puppy Dog Ploy: A firm accommodates entry
and reduces investment as a way of looking
quiescent.
• Top Dog: An incumbent increases investment
as a means of deterring entry.
The question for each market is to determine
the profile of the incumbent firm. While the
typology is not designed to be generally
applicable, its models can be used more
generally if they are viewed as characteristics of
markets rather than strategies of firms. For
example, one can see that the Fat Cat effect is
common in the music market as firms over-
invest in advertising/PR to increase the costs of
entry of new players in order to make them less
able to compete aggressively on price.
Bertrand or Cournot?
Another useful tool for an assessment of a
market is to look at the market in relation to the
models developed in the 19th century by
Cournot and Bertrand. The Cournot-Bertrand
Paradox is useful as a preliminary step in
assessing markets and strategic behaviour. Its
two approaches are:
• Cournot market: Each (of the two) firm(s)
chooses its output level and the combined
output of the two sets the price. The oil
market is the clearest example of a Cournot
oligopoly.
• Bertrand market: Each (of the two) firm(s)
uses price as the key variable and adjusts
output accordingly.
The paradox of the original models was that a
Cournot market led to prices below the
monopoly price but above the perfectly
competitive market price. A Bertrand market,
however, led to prices the same as those
modelled in a perfectly competitive market.
The ‘paradox’ has tended to be solved by a
game theoretic application involving either
different costs or information problems. In both
cases, Bertrand markets develop Cournot
solutions: that is, markets originally developed
on a price basis end up not setting perfectly
competitive prices but prices between
monopoly and competition. 
The key question for analysts in this area is:
‘what sort of market am I looking at: Bertrand
or Cournot?’ ‘Is output or price the primary
variable?’ Answering these questions will 
focus down the chain at the mechanisms for
setting output and prices and the speed with
which these decisions can be altered. Think of
the oil market, where enormous sums are
invested in getting output organised — the
price of oil is a secondary driver to this.
However, the volatility of Cournot market
prices leads to collusion to restrict supply and
control price. The oil market is naturally a
Cournot market but the OPEC cartel tries to
apply a Bertrand model – and the tension 
is apparent. 
Key questions in Bertrand-Cournot:
• Is this market predominantly a Bertrand or
Cournot market?
• Is this market naturally one or the other?
• How quickly can the market adjust either
price or output?
• If output is sticky, how likely is a collusive




Identification of predatory pricing is
notoriously difficult. Roger Fones (19), of the
Department of Justice, outlines a number of
principles that the DoJ has applied to cases of
predation: 20
• It is not illegal predation unless consumers
are worse off in the long run as a result.
• A pricing strategy by a suspected predator
harms consumers when the strategy is
rational only if the victim exits the market.
• The incumbent’s prices must be ‘below an
appropriate measure’ of its own costs.
– Corollary A: An appropriate measure of
costs should not establish a price umbrella
for inefficient firms.  
– Corollary B: An appropriate measure of
costs should minimise the risks of
condemning legitimate competitive
behaviour.
– Corollary C: An appropriate measure of
cost should be reasonably measurable with
a high degree of confidence and
predictability.
The UK’s OFT has identified factors to be taken
into account in predation cases. 21 Although the
particular case in question involved no finding
of predatory pricing, the then-Director General
of Fair Trading did spell out the test to
determine the existence of predation. Three
factors needed to be taken into account:
• The relationship between prices and costs;
• The structure and other characteristics of the
market for the product in question;
• Any evidence on the motives and intention
of the firm and any relevant evidence from
its behaviour in other markets’ 22
Both definitions satisfy the classic three-stage
process (pricing below cost, exit and
recoupment) and add a degree of common
sense to the cost measurement problem.
Identifying predation is important because of
its impact on the effective functioning of
markets. The great Alfred Kahn summed up
the importance of predatory behaviour to the
chilling of competition: ‘The extent to which
markets are effectively contestable cannot be
independent of the ways in which the rich,
dominant incumbents responded in the past to
previous entrants. As Irwin Seltzer once put it,
a No Trespassing sign alone may not deter a
hiker from walking on another’s property but
when, just beyond the sign, the field is littered
with bodies of previous trespassers — and all
the more when other fields, owned by other
people, are similarly littered — the lesson is
likely to sink in.’ 23
The key problem in identifying predation is
picking normal competitive responses from
predatory behaviour. This has lead Joskow and
Klevorick 24 to identify two types of error 25 that
can be made in predatory pricing claims:
• Type I error: the identification of a
competitive price cut as a predatory price cut.
• Type II error: the failure to detect predatory
pricing.
The Type I and II errors can actually be applied
to almost all competition cases — either
missing behaviour that is damaging or
misidentifying behaviour that is benign.
For predation to be found in a market, Ordover
and Willig identified three basic conditions that
need to be satisfied: 
• The market must be horizontally
concentrated. In an un-concentrated market,
there is sufficient competition discipline from
the remaining rivals to preclude monopoly
power, irrespective of the exit of one firm. 
• The market must be protected by a form of
entry barriers that we term entry hurdles.
These hurdles exist whenever the prospective
entrant is cost-disadvantaged relative to the
incumbent solely because the incumbent is
already functioning as a going concern, and
the entrant has not yet committed the
requisite resources. In general, entry hurdles
arise when investments are not fully
reversible. The need to incur the irreversible
portion of the investment, and thereby to put
that amount at risk, confronts the prospective
entrant with a cost disadvantage relative to
the incumbent whose resources are already
committed. 
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• The presence of re-entry barriers. A re-entry
barrier may be defined as the cost that a firm
that has exited a market must incur to
resume production.’ 26
The key problem with legal tests for predatory
behaviour is that it is out-of-kilter with
developments in competition economics and
limits the focus of authorities on a limited
number of potential abuses. In particular,
predatory behaviour laws underestimate: 
• the fact that information and the signalling of
intention are central to predatory behaviour;
• the creation and maintenance of a reputation
is at the core of much predatory behaviour;
• the relationship between costs and prices is
less important than previously thought;
• the static ‘bright lines’ approach of the
Areeda/Turner rule 27 and the legal approach
that this bolstered are not as relevant as they
once were. 
The problems with identifying and prosecuting
predatory behaviour has led many to recast
predatory behaviour within a broader area,
entitled exclusionary behaviour.
Fighting brands, fighting
ships and reputation 
One of the key drawbacks to traditional
competition analysis of predation is the lack of
focus on:
• Reputation: activities carried out to build
reputation;
• Multi-market contact: competition occurring
in more than one market where activities
designed to protect the position of the firm in
one market leads to predation in another;
• Inter-temporal multi-market competition:
activities in one market designed to ‘warn
off’ competitors from entering another in 
the future.
The use of ‘fighting brands’ or a ‘fighting
company’ is particularly interesting to analyse.
Yamey explains a fighting brand thus: ‘Its sale
is confined to the affected areas; the quantities
offered are controlled so as not to make
unnecessary sacrifices of profit; and it is
withdrawn as soon as the objective has been
attained, namely the acquisition of the
independent by the monopolist, or the
withdrawal of the independent, or its
abandonment of plans of enlarging its share 
of the market.’ 28
He quotes examples of fighting brands from the
Canadian match industry and the use of
‘fighting ships’ by the UK shipping cartels in
the late 19th century when a cartel of shipping
companies responded to independent ships
entering the lucrative China trade market by
dumping capacity on the route to destroy the
market for the independents, drive them from
the route and then re-build the cartel. 29
The chain store paradox 
and signalling
The chain store paradox 30 identified a paradox
between a formal game theoretical model and
real-world experience. The model operated
with a 20-store incumbent chain store facing
entry by a new firm. The model suggests that
the incumbent would never fight entry. In
reality, that incumbent would fight the first
entrant as a means of sending a signal to all
potential entrants.
The paradox was solved by introducing:
• Imperfect information
• Reputation
Kreps and Wilson 31 introduced the concept of
‘imperfect information’ or uncertainty, They
found that ‘if rivals perceive the slightest
chance that an incumbent firm might employ
‘rapacious responses,’ then the incumbent’s
optimal strategy is to employ such behaviour
against its rivals in all, except possibly the last
few, in a long string of encounters. For the
incumbent, the immediate cost of predation is a
worthwhile investment to sustain or enhance
its reputation, thereby deterring subsequent
challenges.’ 32 Yun Joo Jung, John H Kagel and
Dan Levin took the chain store paradox,
remodelled it along the lines developed by
Kreps and Wilson and found that ‘predatory
pricing is alive and well’. 33
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Conduct criteria
• Some uncertainty should exist in the minds
of rivals as to whether price initiatives will be
followed. 
• Firms should strive to attain their goals
independently, without collusion.
• There should be no unfair, exclusionary,
predatory or coercive tactics.
• Inefficient suppliers and customers should
not be shielded permanently.
• Sales promotion should be informative, or at
least not misleading.
• There should be no persistent, harmful price
discrimination.
Performance criteria
• Firms’ production and distribution
operations should be efficient and not
wasteful of resources.
• Output levels and product quality (e.g.
variety, durability, safety, reliability and so
forth) should be responsive to consumer
demands.
• Profits should be at levels just sufficient to
reward investment, efficiency and
innovation.
• Prices should encourage rational choice,
guide markets toward equilibrium and not
intensify cyclical instability.
• Opportunities for introducing technically
superior new products and processes should
be exploited.
• Promotional expenses should not be
excessive.







The established models of competition
(perfect, monopolistic, oligopolistic, etc.)
and the interpretations discussed in the
preceding sections are theoretical models.
While they are useful as constructs upon
which to judge actual markets, a definition
of ‘workable competition’ can be valuable.
A useful definition of the workable competition
target can be arrived at by combining our
thinking on consumer behaviour with more
established work on Structure-Conduct-
Performance. 34 We propose that the targets
sought by competition regulators be
supplemented as follows:
Consumer behaviour criteria
• Information should be transparent and as
independent as possible.
• Consumers must be provided with, or at least
not denied, opportunities to learn in markets.
• Unnecessary sunk costs by the consumer
should be avoided.
• Pressure-free re-evaluations should be
afforded consumers wherever possible.
• Search costs should not be artificially
increased.
• Feedback loops should be as timely and
accurate as possible.
• Losses and gains should be de-linked
wherever practicable to allow consumers to
bundle and re-bundle gains and losses.
Structural criteria
• The number of traders should be at least as
large as scale economies permit.
• There should be no artificial inhibitions on
mobility and entry.
• There should be moderate and price-sensitive





Two key questions need to be answered in
the study of regulation: when does
regulation occur and when should
regulation occur? While both questions are
often lumped together into a single query, it
is important to split them apart and identify
both the drivers for regulation and the time
when regulation is an appropriate response.
What exactly is regulation?
While the topic of regulation is a key one in so
many contemporary debates, it is not always
clear what is being talked about. Commentators
in the debate range in their definitions of
regulation across all forms of legal control, all
forms of economic control and all forms of
regulation aimed at natural monopoly
problems. We are presented with two clear
problems in this regard. Firstly, how does one
define regulation as a category of activity and
secondly, how does one identify the areas
within which regulation occurs. 
Anthony Ogus quotes Roger Noll 35 as arguing
that the ‘central meaning’ of regulation is as a
‘sustained and focused control exercised by a
public agency over activities that are valued by
a community’. This characterisation indicates
that the focus of regulation is on those activities
of general value to the community. 
Ogus argues for two models of the form of
regulation: the collectivist and market models. 
Under the collectivist system:
• Regulation has a directive function. ‘To
achieve the desired ends, individuals are
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compelled by a superior authority – the State
– to behave in particular ways with the threat
of sanctions if they do not comply.’
• It is public law in the sense that in general it
is for the State (or its agents) to enforce the
obligations which cannot be over-reached by
private agreement between the parties
concerned.
• Because the State plays a fundamental role in
the formulation as well as enforcement of the
law, it is typically centralised.
Under the market model:
• Regulation has a facilitative function, offering
a set of formalised arrangements with which
individuals can ‘clothe’ their welfare-seeking
activities and relationships.
• Private nature differs from regulation in that:
– it is left to individuals to enforce rights;
– obligations are incurred voluntarily, in the
sense that they can be displaced by
agreements between the affected parties if
found to be inappropriate:
• Private law is largely decentralised. 
What is clear from these two models is that in
most market economies, the model of
regulation that applies most directly is a
mixture of the two. The exact balance of the
mixture will depend on the area of law and the
economy subject to the regulation. For example,
public utilities regulation is considerably more
collectivist in nature than the regulation of
commercial contracts. 
Ogus further divides social from economic
regulation and identifies the two main drivers
for social regulation as arising from the classic
definition of market failure:
• Individuals in an existing or potential
contractual relationship with firms supplying
goods or services have inadequate
information concerning the quality offered by
suppliers. In consequence, the unregulated
market may fail to meet their preferences.
• Even if this information problem does not
exist, market transactions may have spillover
effects (or externalities) which adversely




What it is and why
it has grown
Using the classic model of information and
externality based market failure, Ogus provides
a useful typology of potential regulatory
solutions. He posits three central elements to
the regulatory spectrum in dealing with classic
social regulation-based mechanisms for
addressing market failures:
Low end of spectrum:
• Information regulation: forcing suppliers to
disclose details concerning the quality of
their goods and services:
• Private regulation: imposing obligations
which can be enforced only by individuals
for whose benefit they have been created;
• Economic instruments: these are not coercive
but rather induce desirable behaviour by
financial incentives.
Middle of the spectrum: 
• ‘Command-and-control’ in which standards
backed by criminal sanctions are imposed on
suppliers.
High end of the spectrum
• Highly interventionist approach of prior
approval which prohibits the undertaking of
an activity without a license or authorisation
issued by an agency. 
The threefold characterisation of choices in
regulation is matched by the approach used by
Friedman 36 where the protection offered by
licensing is only one of three possible
approaches:
• Registration (e.g. of automobiles, pedigree
dogs);
• Certification: does not directly involve the
police power of the State in economic
transactions (e.g. common in medical
specialities);
• Licensure: directly involves the police power
of the State (e.g. only licensed medical
doctors allowed to practice medicine)
The approach taken by Ogus is echoed in the
work of Buchanan and Tullock, who argue that
there are essentially three choices for decision-
makers in responding to a market failure. 
These are to:
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1. Rely on individual or private action
2. Organise voluntary exchange
3. Organise a collective choice
As the outline suggests, the key problem with
choices two and three are that they impose
considerable organisational costs on those
seeking to use them. While private or
individual action imposes costs on the
individual undertaking the action, the
organisation of voluntary exchanges or
collective choice creates organisational and co-
ordination problems, the latter often being held
up as an example of market failure. 
It is interesting to compare the relative
popularity of the three approaches across time
and across industries. For many years, the
regulation of many retail financial services
products have relied on the low-end spectrum
of regulation, most notably information
regulation. In contrast, privatised industries
have tended to operate a licensing system, the
most interventionist approach. As the market
has evolved over time, this has moved toward
the middle element of the spectrum. The
spectrum reflects the middle ground between
the more collectivist high-end intervention and
the more classically market-oriented low-end of
the spectrum. The fact that the middle of the
spectrum is most common in regulatory
interventions is further evidence that the mixed
approach is most appropriate in what is still a
mixed market economy. 
Why regulation has grown
Defining regulation can be difficult because of
the range of options available to the regulator
and the regulated. What is clear is that the role
of regulation has grown in importance since
World War II. This is not to argue that the post-
war world has become obsessed with
regulation of everyday life. It is more a
reflection of the evolution of politics in many
countries. The regulation of industry moved
from being an issue of significant political
revolt and debate to one of bureaucratic
efficiency and societal equity. The growth in
regulation has emerged from a number of
sources: 
Part I: What it is and why it has grown
• A significant change in the perception of the
role of the State in the economy. In the UK,
the immediate post-war election of a Labour
government and the creation of the NHS and
a wave of nationalisation was evidence of a
marked change in the attitude of the public
and political elite to the role of the State.
Much of the later political debate has 
centred on the importance and diminution 
of that role. 
• Increased public awareness of market
shortcomings. Political demands for
regulation have grown with the growing
transparency of political debates and the
highlighting of failures in market provision.
The nationalisation and privatisation of the
rail industry is a good example of an
industry whose shortcomings are well
publicised.  
• Universal suffrage which placed
governments under pressure to adopt
policies that appealed to a broader section of
population and a process of political
organisation centred around regulatory
demands. The cosy world of elite politics
which directed regulation toward specific
goals has been replaced by a broader base
from which demands for regulation emerge.
• The structure of political rewards. The
creation of regulation and regulatory
agencies creates a group of individuals
whose interests are best served by
maintaining influence and apportioning
benefits to maintain their position. 
• Rapid advances in technology constituted
greater threats to health and safety: 19th and
early 20th century politics were largely about
risk, health and safety. The post-war world
saw regulatory agencies internalise that
debate. This has lead to a bureaucratisation
of the means by which increasingly complex
technology-based risks have emerged.
• The ‘rights revolution’ in post-war developed
economies: The emergence of a political
debate centred, in part, on the idea that
citizens have rights to certain services and
products has altered the regulatory contract.
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• The tendency of politicians to add to the
regulatory burden is great, given their short
accountability horizon.
• Decoupling between the burdens of and
benefits of regulation: This process takes 
two forms: 
– micro-decoupling; where benefits from an
existing or prospective government
programme are concentrated in a particular
group while costs are broadly dispersed
among the public as taxpayers or
consumers;
– macro-decoupling; where political power
rests with the voting majority, while a
minority provides most of the tax base.
Dicey: ‘[T]he beneficial effect of State
intervention, especially in the form of
legislation, is direct, immediate and visible,
whereas its evil effects are gradual and indirect
and lie out of sight’. 
Consumers and regulation
Why regulation should happen
The classic case for regulation rests on the idea
that markets fail in the delivery of certain
goods or services, or produce unacceptable side
effects in delivering the good or service.
However, the definition of when regulation
should occur is hotly debated. The minimalist
approach argues that ‘(t)he most fully accepted
argument for intervention relates to what is
variously known as the public good, collective-
consumption or non-exclusivity problem.
Situations arise in which it is impossible or at
least infeasible or undesirable to exclude
anyone from the consumption of a commodity.’
37 In this conception, intervention can only be
argued to be positive if it addresses the classic
public goods problem. Interestingly, the
minimalist approach does not include
externalities, commonly assumed to be a trigger
point for intervention. Ogus has a 
more fulsome list of trigger points for
regulation:
Key failures:
• monopolies and natural monopolies;
• public goods: consumption by one person
does not leave less for others to consume; it
is impossible or too costly for the supplier to
exclude those who do not pay from the
benefit;
• Other externalities: problems of attempts to
correct externalities:
– the third party on whom the cost is
imposed may have received ex ante, or will
receive ex post, indirect compensation for
the loss (e.g. temporary road closure to
resurface and increase traffic);
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– externalities are not unilaterally imposed.
There is friction from the competing and
conflicting claim of two parties for use of a
single resource; the burden of avoiding or
eliminating the friction should be imposed
on whichever party can achieve this at
lowest cost;
– Not appropriate to eliminate ‘pecuniary
externalities’: pure value (financial)
changes borne by third parties which result
from changes in technology or in consumer
preferences. They involve indirect effects
which alter the demand faced by the
harmed or benefited third party. Pecuniary
externalities are the result of the natural
play of market forces. They involve wealth
transfers which cancel out and do not
increase the costs faced by society. 38
– Transaction costs: externality may give rise
to a misallocation but the administrative and
other costs of correcting it may outweigh the
social benefits arising from such actions;
• Information deficits and bounded rationality;
• Co-ordination problems:’…the private law
was used to facilitate the co-ordination of
utility-maximising activities. Contracts and
legal forms of organisation, notably
corporations, are used overtly for this
purpose. Such specific legal arrangements
give rise, of course, to significant transactions
costs; and other private-law concepts,
particularly torts and property rights, can be
treated as transactions costs savings devices
to the extent that they lay down standards of
behaviour that it is assumed the parties
would have agreed to in contracts if
transactions costs had not inhibited
them….although coercion is invariably
involved, regulation justified on this basis is
not really forcing people to do what they
don’t want to do, but rather enabling them 
to do what they want to do by forcing them
to do it’;  
• Exceptional market conditions and macro-
economic considerations.’ 39s
Ogus also ties market failure to a failure of law.
He argues that a prima facie case exists for
regulation in the public interest where the
‘market failure’ is accompanied by a ‘private




law failure’. He further points to non-economic
goals of regulation in seeking to further
distributional justice, community values or
some form of paternalism, which he defines as
‘the interference with a person’s liberty of
action justified by reasons referring exclusively
to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests
or values of the person being coerced.’ 40
The tendency of economists to react against the
social aspects of regulation has been tempered
in some areas by the experience of the fallibility
of markets and of consumers in them. A paper
by Joseph Stiglitz, Peter and Jonathan Orszag
called ‘The Role of Government in a Digital
Age’ provides a slightly broader list of criteria
under which reasons for regulation can be
found. The criteria they list are:
• ‘Failure of competition…(t)he government
therefore has a role to play in ensuring
effective competition in private markets.
• Public goods…(I)n general, private markets
will not supply public good (41) – or not
supply them in sufficient quantities – and
therefore the government has a role to play
in providing them. 
• Externalities.…In general, the government
has a role to play in correcting negative
externalities or promoting positive
externalities. Without government
involvement, private markets will typically
under-produce goods with positive
externalities and over-produce goods with
negative externalities.
• Incomplete markets. A possible justification
for government activity is incomplete markets.
For example, imperfections in capital and
insurance markets – such as the absence of
insurance coverage for certain types of risks –
may warrant government involvement. A
classic example of an imperfect capital market
is the inability to borrow against higher future
earnings, which justifies a government role in
providing loans or loan guarantees for post-
secondary education expenses. In addition,
certain types of goods or services may require
large-scale co-ordination, which may be
possible but difficult to achieve without
governmental assistance.
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• Information failures….information is in some
ways a public good, and therefore this
rationale for government is similar to the
second rationale.
• Macroeconomic fluctuations. The
government has a role to play in correcting
macroeconomic imbalances, such as those
that lead to periodic problems with high
unemployment, inflation, or recession.
• Redistribution. Even if private markets
produce goods and services efficiently, society
may not like the distribution of income that
results. The government may therefore have a
role in redistributing income – for example,
through a progressive tax system – to produce
a more equal distribution of income.
• Merit goods. There may be cases in which
individuals would make ‘bad’ decisions if
left to their own devices and in which
government paternalism is therefore
warranted. For example, the government
compels individuals to attend school or wear
seat belts largely because it is concerned that
people will not do ‘what’s best’ in the
absence of such mandates. The government
may sometimes be justified in compelling
individuals to consume ‘merit goods’ (e.g.
elementary education).’
Stiglitz et al thus explicitly recognise that
market failure can extend beyond the simply
monopolisation and public goods problem and
generation of externalities and extend into
incomplete markets, information problems and
poor decision-making by individuals. However,
the most interesting inclusion is that of
redistribution, a factor often left outside of
classical economic approaches to regulation.
While most discussion of redistribution has
tended to focus on taxation systems
rebalancing income distribution resulting from
the interplay of market forces, regulation has a
much broader role to play in redistributive
policies. This is particularly true in the area of
utility regulation, where redistribution has
always been an implicit part of the system
(through universal service obligations) but
where the introduction of marginal cost pricing
has exposed the redistributive policies to
greater pressure and scrutiny than before.
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Why regulation does happen
The enormous literature that exists on the
instance of regulation can be seen as part of the
positive approach to regulation: the study of
when regulation does occur. The literature on
when regulation should occur is less
voluminous. This more normative approach
tends less to advocacy and more toward
identifying factors common to regulatory
interventions and attempts to predict when
such circumstances will lead to intervention.
Separating out the normative from the positive
is never a straightforward process. 
One such approach (Normative Analysis as a
Positive Theory, or NPT) argues that 'regulation
is supplied in response to the public’s demand
for the correction of a market failure or for the
correction of highly inequitable practices (e.g.
price discrimination or firms receiving windfall
profits due to some change in industry
conditions.) According to this theory, if a
market is a natural monopoly, the public will
demand that the industry be regulated because
a first best solution is not achieved in the
absence of regulation. Unfettered competition
will result in either too many firms producing
and/or price exceeding the socially optimal
level. By regulating the industry, net welfare
gains result. It is this potential for welfare gains
that generates the public demand for
regulation. In this way, the public interest
theory uses normative analysis (when should
regulation occur) to produce a positive theory
(when does regulation occur).'
Viscusi et al argue that the NPT approach is both
refuted by evidence and ignores the process by
which regulation occurs. It is thus a rather flat
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approach to dealing with the development of
regulation. They choose to reformulate NPT in a
potentially more cynical manner as: ‘regulation
is originally put in place to correct a market
failure but then is mismanaged by the regulatory
agency.’ But even this approach fails to
sufficiently stack up in the real world of
regulation, both for not dealing with industries
suffering regulation despite a lack of market
failure (as it is classically defined) nor industries
that actually seek regulation. 
Theory of regulation: 
Stigler-Peltzman
Perhaps the most significant advance in the
study of regulation came in the work of Stigler
who attempted to develop a general economic
theory of regulation. In a now classic article 42,
Stigler argued that interest groups will seek to
maximise their income by seeking to persuade
the State to use its monopoly of coercion to
their benefit. Regulation is a key tool for
interest groups to persuade the State to
redistribute income from one group to another.
The basic argument that interest groups will
seek to persuade the State to redistribute
resources for their benefit was further
advanced by Peltzman 43. His key assumption is
that the individual who controls regulatory
policy chooses policy to maximise political
support. Most US academics assume this
regulator to be, in the first instance, a politician.
While this assumption does not always hold
true, it is a useful starting point. Other work,
most notably from the Public Choice school
and from capture theory, deals more directly
with regulatory bureaucracies and agencies. 
Peltzman argues that in deciding government
policies, a politician will decide the size of the
group that will gain from regulation and how
much wealth should be transferred to them.
This calculation will be made as part of a desire
to be re-elected and thus involves assessments
of political support (both in terms of votes and
financing). Naturally a regulatory policy that
involves a transfer to a group also involves a
transfer from a group. Here the politician will
need to assess the opposition likely to emerge
from the group suffering a loss. As a rule-of-




thumb, the opposition to a measure will
increase along two vectors: the size of the
population likely to lose out and the intensity
of this group. On balance, a regulator will
choose a policy (defined by the size of the
group that gains and the amount of the transfer
to them) to maximise political support minus
political opposition. The object is thus net
political support. There is no mention, or
necessary place, for assessments of overall
social welfare. 
One of the main benefits of the
Stigler/Peltzman approach is that it helps to
identify both those industries where regulation
is to occur and those interests most likely to
lose out in regulatory debates. In short, the
model argues that regulation is likely to be
biased toward the benefit of a small,
concentrated interest group with strongly felt
preferences at a loss to a large interest group
with weakly felt preferences (e.g. consumers.)
The weakness of the larger social interest is key
in this analysis, both as a demandeur of
regulation and as a recipient of regulatory
costs. In the case of demanding regulation, the
model argues that a large beneficiary group
will be weak because of the rising marginal cost
of organisation and its tendency to consume
the benefits sought. Keeping per capita benefits
high requires that the interest group be kept
small. Keeping the costs of regulation dispersed
limits opposition as the rising marginal cost of
organisation easily wipes out the marginal loss
from a policy. 
A second key conclusion from the
Stigler/Peltzman model is that regulation will
also be sub-optimal in advancing the wealth
and social interest of the community. This is
because regulators will seek to maximise their
own net benefit rather than the maximum
benefit possible. Trade-offs and middle ground
will always be sought to maximise benefits
minus losses. Following the first conclusion, it
is relatively straightforward to reduce benefits
by a small amount to each gainer. Such a small
reduction in gain will actually result in a large
reduction in loss for each individual loser (as
the loss is spread out across such a large
group). Such a strategy will minimise
opposition (raising the marginal cost of
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organising such opposition). Thus regulation is
likely to regulate both price and entry to the
benefit of incumbents (as this directly
positively affects profits) but will not reach
monopoly pricing levels as a means of limiting
opposition. 
The third major advance of the theory is the
identification of industries that are likely to be
prone to regulation. This argument can be
summed up as follows. Industries where the
price achieved is similar to that likely under
regulation (not the full monopoly price, but
higher than under competition) are unlikely to
see much demand for regulation. This is
because neither party (industry or consumer)
has much interest in organising to see change.
However, industries where the price achieved
is significantly lower than that seen in the
potential regulated industry will see a demand
for regulation from the firms already in it. In
the real world, this is evidenced by firms
developing entry requirements, codes of
conduct, etc. that raise entry barriers and
restrict competition. Likewise, in industries
where prices are significantly above that likely
under regulation, consumers are likely to
demand regulation to lower payments. Thus
demands for regulation are most likely to occur
both in relatively competitive industries (where
incumbents will gain from restricting entry)
and in monopolistic industries (where
consumers will gain from seeking regulation). 
Role of interest groups
While much of the literature on regulation
focuses on the market failure justification for
regulation, a second approach, focused on the
role of interest groups, has risen to prominence.
The Stigler/Peltzman approach is an example
of a hybrid approach modelling both markets
and interest group lobbying. The importance of
the interest group in seeking gains from
regulation has been recognised officially in the
US Annual Report of the Council of Economic
Advisers (1994); ‘As recognised by both the
framers of the Constitution and modern
scholars of public choice, all political systems
provide interest groups with an incentive for
‘rent seeking’ that is, manipulation of collective
action for private benefit…[rent seeking] can
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lead government agencies to make decisions
that benefit a particular interest group even
though they are costly to society as a whole’.44
Gary Becker models interest group lobbying as
a zero sum game: no one group can gain unless
another one loses. Aggregate influence is fixed.
The implication is that what is important for
determining the amount of regulatory activity
(as measured by the wealth transfer) is the
influence of one group relative to the influence
of another group. For Becker, the political
process is one in which politicians transmit the
interests of interest groups (e.g. firms,
consumers or voters). What matters in this
process is the relative balance of power
between the groups. While Stigler/Peltzman
argued that the lobbying of some groups was
always more likely to be stronger than others,
Becker takes the problem of free-riding (interest
group members gaining without any effort in
the cause) as a problem shared by all interest
groups. What matters for Becker is that the
optimal pressure to be applied by one group
depends almost entirely on the pressure being
applied by the opposition group. The familiar
patter of lobbying (e.g. one side hires lawyers,
the other does the same) escalates into a
lobbying arms race. This arms race uses up
resources that could more effectively used in
promoting development and efficiency, rather
than wasted in lobbying battles. 
The disdain for the wasteful activities of
interest groups is shared by the Public Choice
school. One of its major lines of inquiry is on
the process of political 'rent-seeking'. Rent-
seeking is defined as ‘the resource-wasting
activities of individuals in seeking transfers of
wealth through the aegis of the State’. 45
Interestingly for the Public Choice school, the
waste of rent-seeking is not identified as
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existing in the creation of monopoly positions
through government action, but the use of
resources to maintain that position. As David B.
Johnson 46 puts it: ‘The nation’s resources are
withdrawn from productive activity and put to
rent-seeking activity by the monopolist because
he is willing to pay a higher price. The
monopolist gains a monopoly right, but citizens
lose because the resources which could have
been producing real goods and services are
used to chase rents.’
The activity and relative strength of interest
groups was rather effectively modelled by
James Q. Wilson. His typology of political
lobbying activity is reproduced in tabular 
form below. 
For Wilson, normal regulatory politics divide
along axes of benefits and costs. Where costs
are concentrated on a particular group but
benefits are also concentrated on a particular
group, we tend to see a pattern of interest
group politics. Such interest groups are ranged
equally against each other as, to borrow from
Stigler/Peltzman, the marginal costs/benefits
of organisation are similar for each group. For
example, one can see a situation where a steel
industry seeking a protective anti-dumping
tariff seeks to gain from such a policy but finds
itself met by auto makers who will lose a good
deal if the steel makers gain. In both instances,
one finds a small numbers group of highly
concentrated interests with much to gain and
lose. Wilson's model posits that government
action is uncertain in this area. Given the
Stigler/Peltzman calculation, the net political
benefit calculation is difficult to make. 
In contrast, where the benefits of a policy are
concentrated on one interest group but the
losses are spread out over a larger number, one




Concentrated CONTROVERSY GOVT ACTION
UNCERTAIN GOVT ACTION Client politics
Interest Group politics
Diffuse GOVT ACTION UNCERTAIN GOVT ACTION
Entrepreneurial politics Majoritarian politics
tends to find a model of client politics. Here the
group seeking to gain from a regulatory
solution will try to impose that cost on wider
society. Examples of this model abound and
regularly occur in the agricultural sector.
Government action is likely to occur in
situations of client politics as the
Stigler/Peltzman net benefit swings in favour
clearly of those seeking to extract benefits to
the cost of society. Such benefits will never be
the maximum possible, given the need to
maximise net benefits to the regulator. 
Where both costs and benefits are diffuse, one
finds almost the model of representative
democracy that western civilisation is supposed
to aspire to. Indeed, a strand of regulatory
thought – that of civic republicanism – captures
the approach of the Majoritarian political
discourse. In Cass R Sunstein’s formulation, the
republican civic tradition is characterised by
four key principles: 47
1. Deliberation in politics is made possible by a
focus on civic virtue;
2. There is an equality among political actors
together with a commitment to eliminate
disparities in political participation and
unbalanced influence among individuals or
groups;
3. There is a belief in universalism as a process
of mediation based on practical reasoning
that yields correct outcomes that benefit the
common good;
4. Citizenship, as indicated by a broad guarantee
of rights of participation.
The civic republican tradition thus appears,
under the Wilson model, to only apply in those
situations where benefits and costs are both
diffuse. Like the model of interest group
politics, it is unclear whether or not
government action will arise when both costs
and benefits are diffuse. As under the
Stigler/Peltzman model, the net political
benefit calculation is difficult to make. It is also
not clear that making the calculation is likely to
be an urgent requirement. 
Perhaps the most interesting area of the model
is the area where benefits are diffuse but costs
are concentrated. Here we enter the realm of
the entrepreneurial politician. The entrepre-
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neurial politician needs to mobilise a diffuse
group of interests, each with a relatively small
benefit to be sought, to counteract a
concentrated group with a good deal to lose.
Wilson argues that the only way in which such
a campaign can succeed in bringing forward
government action is for the policy
entrepreneur to utilise a broad, socially
accepted, moral discourse to challenge the
concentrated group that is likely to bear the
cost of action. In essence the body seeking to
impose a concentrated cost to the benefit of
many must appeal to societal norms of fairness
and equity and target those bearing the cost as
not conforming to those norms. If the group
representing the diffuse interest fails in its task ,
the body bearing the cost will seek government
action to minimise that cost and limit the
benefits of the wider group. If it succeeds it can
(in Stigler/Peltzman terms) minimise their
marginal cost of organisation by tying everyone
into a shared vision of change. For interest
groups seeking to impose a cost on an industry,
this area of politics is perhaps the most difficult
arena to operate in while offering the
potentially greatest benefit. One can see
examples of this approach in the environmental
movement.
Watching out for the
bootleggers
One of the most interesting and colourful
approaches to regulation was put forward by
Bruce Yandle in ‘Bootleggers and Baptists in the
Theory of Regulation,’ which sought to add to
the Stigler (which interest groups would
succeed) and Peltzman (no one group would
dominate and a balance would be struck)
approaches. The Bootlegger-Baptist approach
offers a terribly apposite description of the real
world of interest group lobbying. The approach
has two starting points. Firstly, it starts from
the premise that alliances can be formed
around issues for totally contradictory reasons.
Secondly, it argues that rhetoric can be just as
important as campaign finance. No lobbying
will succeed unless it combines the two. The
Bootlegger-Baptist alliance centred on the
campaign to maintain the policy of prohibition
in the US in the 1930s. The Baptists wanted to
keep the policy as a moral effort to stop
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Americans from succumbing to the demon
drink. Bootleggers, on the other hand,
supported prohibition because it guaranteed
them enormous profits. An unholy alliance was
thus formed to keep a policy in place; Baptists
providing the moral rhetoric to stir the spirit of
the American electorate and bootleggers
providing funds to ensure their market was not
threatened.
As Yandle himself argues: 'B&B theory helps to
explain how leaders of consumer groups help
major pharmaceutical companies (the ones with
approved chemical entities) by valiantly
supporting a cautious FDA approval process.
The theory explains why holders of permits to
produce and market EPA-approved insecticides
value the efforts of environmental groups who
oppose rule changes that facilitate the entry of
new and sometimes less risky substitutes.
Indeed, once the theory is explained,
bootleggers and Baptists seem to come out of
the woodwork. 
Perhaps we should we expect no less. Political
action, which by definition always serves some
interest groups, requires politicians to appeal to
popular icons. By making a “Baptist” appeal,
the canny politician enables voters to feel better
by endorsing socially accepted values in the
voting booth. The same politician, if he is
adroit, also can enjoy the support of
appreciative bootleggers in the costly struggle
to hold office. Bootleggers and Baptists are part
of the glue that binds the body politic.47
Of course, the Bootlegger-Baptist theory does
help to identify potentially dangerous alliances.
However, it can lead to an overly cynical view
of the world and one that often ignores the
reality of interest group position forming. It is
easy to assume that common positions are
arrived at in a concerted and collusive way. It is
also easy to assume that interest groups are
intelligent enough, or aware enough, to know
that an alliance might exist. The reality is
considerably more complex. However, the
approach does provide a salutary warning to
public interest groups that find themselves in
bed with unlikely allies – all Baptists must be
on the lookout for bootleggers, as they will seek
to impose costs on the cleric's flock.
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Government failure and the
role of regulators
The importance of the role of the regulator was
recognised by John Landis, former dean of the
Harvard Law School, in his report to President
Kennedy: ‘The prime key to the improvement
of the administrative process is the selection of
qualified personnel. Good men make poor laws
workable; poor men will wreak havoc with
good laws.’ 48
Landis chose to focus on the need for good
administrators; however, Wilson 49 has
questioned this categorisation of the good
administrator by outlining essentially three
categories of administrator in a regulatory
agency:
1. The Careerist: An employee aiming at long-
term employment in the agency. The major
concern of the Careerist is that the agency
continues to exist and grows. A Careerist
tends to look down on deregulation. 
2. The Politician: An employee who see the
agency as a stepping stone to bigger, better
things. This category of employee tends to be
board member or commissioner level.
3. The Professional: This employee identifies
more with holder of the same skills (e.g. law,
economics) than with the regulatory agency.
What is important for the professional is the
maintenance of the professional esteem 
of peers.
What Wilson's categorisation brings out is the
focus of a school of academia on the role of the
regulator and the government itself. 





The development of Public Choice Theory
really came to the fore in the 1970-80s. The
Public Choice approach is not a uniform one
and involves a number of different targets. In
general, positivist Public Choice theorists
analyse the political process underlying the
legislative activity, rules of bureaucratic
decision-making; actual decisions of the
bureaucracy; the regulatory process and its
rules and regulations, and the constitutional
process, particularly the rules for making rules.
The more normative members of the public
choice community analyse the same sorts of
areas but do so in an effort to ensure that the
most efficiency enhancing solution is arrived at.
Unlike the approach adopted by Posner, the
public choice approach focuses on non-judicial
rule-making and tends to look mostly at
regulatory and bureaucratic decision-making.
The focus on the government and the
bureaucracy of regulation violates one of the
tenets of classical and neo-classical economics
— namely that the State is a black box and is
exterior to the operation of the economy. For
neo-classicists, the institutions and decisions of
government are exogenous (external) to
government, while for public choice theorists
the decisions of institutions are endogenous
(internal) to the economy. James M. Buchanan
has described this approach as follows:
‘The critically important bridge between the
behaviour of persons who act in the
marketplace and the behaviour of persons who
act in political process must be analysed. The
‘theory of public choice’ can be interpreted as
the construction of such a bridge. The approach
requires only the simple assumption that the
same individuals act in both relationships.
Political decisions are not handed down from
on high by omniscient beings who cannot err.
Individuals behave in market interactions, in
political-government interactions, in co-
operative-governmental interactions, and in
other arrangements. Closure of the behavioural
system, as I am using the term, means only that
analysis must be extended to the actions of
persons in their several separate capacities.’ 50
The focus on efficiency starts from the premise
that all decisions involve a two-fold cost; firstly
the external costs of decision-making (those
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costs borne by those who disapprove of a
decision) and the internal decision-making
costs (the bargaining costs associated with
making a decision).
In a similar vein to the Stigler/Peltzman
approach, the public choice theorists argue that
bureaucrats do not make decisions that are
social welfare enhancing. In terms of economic
theory, the utility-maximisation process of the
bureaucrat is not the same as the maximisation
of social welfare: 'other motives' drive
regulators. Some of these motives form the
characterisation put forward by Wilson above.
Other include 'power, prestige, the size of the
bureau’s budget, job security, perquisites,
future salary and working conditions.'
Public choice theorists argue that legislators
have few incentives to reform bureaucracies to
ensure that they do maximise social welfare.
This lack of incentive comes from a
combination of factors:
• Bureaucracies are difficult to monitor the
performance of (i.e. no profit/loss); 
• The information that does exist is biased, 
as it is typically held by the body itself;
• Politics generally means that inefficiency
rarely leads to the termination of the
bureaucracy; 
• The bureaucrats and clients can form
powerful coalitions against change.
The focus on the government and bureaucracy
often mixes two different areas of inquiry. As
Spence and Gopalakrishnan 51 maintain, the
argument has 'coalesced along two distinguish-
able (but not always distinguished)
dimensions: one that focuses on the substantive
efficiency of regulatory policies, and another
that focuses on procedural efficiency, or rather
the inefficiencies that stem from the process by
which agencies make policy'.
Identifying government failure
While market failure is often claimed as the
primary focus of many analysts, there is a
strong train of academic analysis that suggests
that the failure of government or regulators to
carry out their tasks is a key element in the
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understanding of regulation. Before looking at
the theories around the failings of regulators to
carry out their tasks effectively, we need to
identify what it is that a government does and
how this can be balanced in comparison to the
role of the market. 
It has been argued that the activities provided
by non-market players (e.g. government and
regulatory agencies) are essentially of four
types:
1. regulatory services (e.g., environmental
regulation, radio and TV licensing, interstate
commerce regulation, food and drug control); 
2. ‘pure’ public goods (national defence, space
R&D); 
3. quasi public goods (education, postal
services, health research); 
4. administering transfer payments (federal
state, and local welfare programmes, social
security etc). 52
Because of the nature of these products, the
demands for them and the requirement for
distribution means that there may well be
failures in their provision. These failures are
identified as the government failure
equivalents of market failures. It is argued that
government failure occurs not just on the
demand-side of the equation. The demand side
of government regulation is a key attribute of
the Stigler/Peltzman approach. It tends to
focus on the position of firms in the
marketplace seeking regulation from
government as a means of restricting the
operation of the market. However, the
government failure approach identifies supply-
side problems inherent in the regulatory
contract. In particular, it argues that non-
market goods are beset with problems. Most
notably the following characteristics make the
proper functioning of the non-market difficult:
1. difficulty in defining and measuring output
2. single source production
3. uncertainty of production technology (e.g.
education)
4. absence of bottom line and termination
mechanism 53
The difficulty on the non-market supply-side is
evidenced in UK experience. The recent
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arguments over the setting of targets for public
officials and in health and education are clear
attempts to deal with the problems identified
above; namely the units of measurement and
the operation of a single supplier. The problem
of performance in an environment where the
bottom line is not a primary driver of corporate
performance is also one that most regulators
and government agencies would understand. 
The problems inherent in the nature of non-
market goods can be overplayed. As with all
processes of identification, a number of
‘products’ of the non-market have become
products of the market, such as those in utilities
and in some healthcare systems and law
enforcement operations. However, this does not
invalidate the argument that there are problems
inherent in the production and supply of those
goods. What it does indicate is that the
‘solution’ to the problem of the non-market
good must be continually monitored to identify
the degree to which it has delivered a market
solution to the failure of the non-market to
deliver the desired result. 
Wolf 54 has identified four main types and
sources of failure that arise in the provision of
non-market goods and services:
1. ‘the disjuncture between costs and revenues:
redundant and rising costs: the tendency of
government agencies to continually expand
at the expense of taxpayers/license payers
because the supply of resources is at
someone else’s expense;
2. internalities and organisational goals: the
tendency of government agencies to have
their own agendas and desires to internalise
activities and power, including:
• specific agency maximands 
• budget growth: ‘more is better’ – the
continual desire of agencies to expand. The
annual battle between the ‘spending’
departments in the UK for resources is an
example of this;
• technological advance: ‘new and complex is
better’ – this problem tends to arise in
military departments who continually crave
the latest gadget;
• information acquisition and control
(‘knowing what others don’t know is better’).
Part IV: Government failure, regulators and regulation
3. Derived externalities – generation of
unintended effects: a perennial problem in all
market and non-market activity. Every
decision and action taken will have effects
beyond those intended. The reason it crops
up as a non-market failure is tied into the
problem of accountability and budgeting – if
the agency making the decision is unlikely to
be concerned about its accountability,
unintended side effects are unlikely to be
minimised.
4. Distributional inequity: distributional issues
are often thought of as external to the
regulatory process. Indeed many policies are
designed on the basis that distributional
inequalities that may result from the policy
will be picked up elsewhere.
Comparing market with 
non-market failure
The preceding analysis suggests that both
market and non-market failures exist and that
both market and non-market demands and
supply of regulatory behaviour is subject to
rent-seeking behaviour of one sort or another
(be it firms or bureaucrats). Given this fact, it
might be useful to compare the two approaches
when proposing one or the other as a ‘solution’
to a ‘problem.’
Charles Wolf has done us a service by
tabulating the main characteristics of market
and non-market failure. 55
Wolf’s characterisation is a useful rule-of-thumb
in comparing the potential failures from a policy
proposal. Thus one can ask some basic questions
about the policy being proposed and the
‘problem’ being ‘solved’. For example, where
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significant externalities are being generated by
an industry in terms of pollution, a logical
solution may be to regulate the output.
However, if this is done through the non-market,
one may run up against the desire of the agency
to accrue more power and impose greater costs
on the industry. The ‘solution’ to the ‘problem’
of pollution may thus have been to create an
unwieldy and excessive bureaucracy. 
Of course, Wolf’s characterisation of the polar
choices in failures is not a hard-and-fast rule.
However, it is an indicator of potential
problems and a useful means of designing
regulatory solutions that minimise the failures
inherent in the choices available. 
Wolf also provided a handy matrix of demand
and supply problems in the non-market 
failure arena and tried to tie them together 
(see opposite page). 
This is a useful tool to identify both potential
problems within the non-market sector and
some potential warning signs to look out for, or
for policy solutions to be proposed to minimise
expected failures. 
Wolf draws the following conclusions from 
the matrix:
• The typical miscarriages of the non-market
(i.e. of government) are no less identifiable,
characteristic or predictable than those
commonly attributed to the market;
• The typology of these characteristic non-
market failures suggests that they are both
formidable and relatively neglected;
• Whether they are more or less formidable
than the failures of the market may be
ascertainable and demonstrable in some
contexts but likely to be debatable in others;
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Market and non-market failure compared
Market failures Non-market failures
Externalities and public goods Disjunction between costs and revenues: 
redundant and rising costs
Increasing returns Internalities and organisational goals
Market imperfections Derived externalities
Distributional inequity (income and wealth) Distributional inequity (power and privilege)
• The choice between markets and
governments is not a choice between
perfection and imperfection but between
degrees and types of imperfection, between
degrees and types of failure. In many
instances, it may be simply a choice between
the disagreeable and the intolerable. 56
The result of combining market and non-
market failures presents a difficult balancing
act. On the one hand, market failures clearly
arise and require action. However, the manner
in which society deals with them must
recognise the existence of non-market failure.
This presents the political agency with a
dilemma not of regulation but of balance. In
regulatory policy, the choice is not between
leaving the market to itself or regulating every
element of the market. The political actor must
recognise that in a large number of cases the
market will not want to be left to itself, it will
demand regulation as a means of restricting
competitors and maximising profits. Similarly,
the agency must recognise the problems of non-
market intervention not just in terms of the
ability of the State to deliver, but in terms of the
tendency for non-market failure to emerge. 
Each regulatory quandary is thus likely to be
dealt with in slightly different way. The end
result of any such analysis will be a balance
between market and non-market action. Where
on the continuum between the two the result
sits is likely to depend on a number of key
factors:
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• size and extensiveness of the externalities
resulting from market activities;
• degree of monopoly power associated with
the production and sale of market output;
• extent and visibility of imperfections in 
the market; 
• degree to which distributional benefits which
arise from the market activity are inequitably
distributed. 57
Taking a leaf out of the Public Choice school of
thought can be useful when proposing a non-
market solution: ‘the key is to design
institutions that facilitate competition for those
rents that accompany newly created surpluses
or new wealth creation and that discourage the
wasteful competition for existing rents.’ 58 In all
circumstances, a recognition of the failures of
both market and government must be made
and a recognition that the demand for
regulation can occur from within industries
rather than simply from without. The Public
Choice school recommends that in designing
regulatory solutions:
• the role of government regulation is
circumscribed quite tightly;
• rent-creating government institutions 
are avoided; 
• constitutional reforms are adopted that
require super majorities (two-third or 
three-fourth majorities) to pass rent-seeking-
type legislation.
Part IV: Government failure, regulators and regulation
Typology of combined demand and supply problems in non-market failure
Demand/supply Non-market Non market 
conditions demand conditions supply conditions
Non market Increased Political Decoupling Output Single Uncertain Absence of
failures awareness/ rewards/ measure- source technology termination





rising costs X X X X X X
Internalities and 
organisational goals X X X X
Derived externalities X X X X
Distributional inequities X X X X
In the field of trade policy many of these Public
Choice recommendations have been part of the
regulatory landscape for many years. Following
the disaster of the Great Depression in the US
in the 1930s, trade policy (which constitutional-
ly resides in Congress), was increasingly passed
to the Executive because the politicians were
aware that they could not trust themselves to
avoid coming to the aid of supplicant
industries. US trade policy came to be designed
around insulating the trade policy-making
machinery from rent-seekers; the constitutional
balance of power circumscribed the role of the
Executive agency and the Fast-Track
procedures developed after 1974 ensured that
rent-seeking changes to trade pacts were almost
impossible after the agreement had been
signed. While less well-documented, the means
by which trade policy is made in the EU is
similar, if less successful, in terms of its attempt
to isolate itself from rent-seekers. While not
serving as a model for democratic
inclusiveness, it can be argued that trade policy
has been a more effective model of efficiency.
Here lies a much broader problem in regulatory
policy: the balance between efficiency and
accountability. Here the Public Choice school is
relatively silent. 
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When will regulation 
be successful?
A key challenge for regulators is to identify
solutions to problems that deliver efficiency
improvements or do not make situations
demonstrably worse. The approach often
favoured by economists when studying market
interventions is to look for the Pareto optimal
solution. This solution seeks a position where
any solution creates a situation where no one
can be made better off without someone else
being made worse off. While Pareto optimal
solutions are frequently discussed in economic
textbooks, it is not clear that the optimal
solution can ever be fruitfully and effectively
achieved. It is for this reason that the study of
practical regulation has lead to the
development of two key yardstick targets for
regulation. The targets are generally referred to
as Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and the wealth
maximisation hypothesis.
The need to ensure that a policy is socially
beneficial has been a concern of to economists
and social commentators for years. Nicholas
Kaldor argued in 1939 59 that the repeal of the
Corn Laws was beneficial to society because it
had so benefited consumers that even if
farmers were compensated for their loss,
society would still be in a better position than
before the regime had changed. This benefit
was assessed as existing even if consumers had
chosen not to compensate those who had lost
out as a result of the law change. This is the
Kaldor criterion: a policy is deemed to be
efficient if it results in benefits for those who
gain on such a scale that they ‘potentially’ can
compensate fully all those who have lost out






gainers are not ‘required’ to compensate the
losers for a policy to be deemed efficient. The
approach thus means that the criterion is
achieved when the gains to one group exceed
the losses to another.
The 'compensation' principle approach of
Kaldor was initially a fairly one-dimensional
approach. However, in combination with the
work of Hicks, 60 we have a policy that states
that a legal change can be argued to have
improved societal well-being if and only it,
both the beneficiaries of a change could fully
compensate the losers and remain better off
themselves, and the losers could not have
compensated the beneficiaries sufficiently to
get them to forego their benefits without
themselves being worse off than in their
original position. The compensation principle
thus has a forward and backward induction
process and forms the basis for much of the
cost-benefit analysis that has followed it. 
The relative starkness of the Kaldor-Hicks
approach has been finessed by Richard Posner.
In many ways, the Posner ‘wealth
maximisation’ approach is even more basic
than the compensation principle. Posner has
argued that ‘(a) second meaning of ‘justice’,
and the most common I would argue, is simply
‘efficiency’. When we describe as ‘unjust’
convicting a person without a trial, taking
property without just compensation or failing
to require a negligent automobile driver to
answer in damages to the victim of his
carelessness, we can be interpreted as meaning
simply that the conduct or practice in question
wastes resources.’ 61 Posner places the pursuit
of wealth maximisation as the key driver in
assessments of justice in legal cases. It has to be
noted that Posner is primarily thinking of
common law judgements rather than
administrative law regulatory solutions.
However, his approach is also influential in 
this setting. 
Posner contrasts the wealth maximisation
principle with the more philosophical positions
of utilitarianism and Kantianism (which tend to
emphasis autonomy and human respect). His
contrast must be placed within the debates of
the legal community around justice and
fairness in dealing with real-world cases.
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Posner, after all, is a judge. The advantages of
the wealth maximisation approach for Posner
are five-fold:
1. ‘the pursuit of wealth, based as it is on the
model of the voluntary market transaction,
involves greater respect for individual choice
than in classical utilitarianism’ 62
2. ‘economic liberty…can be grounded more
firmly in wealth maximisation than in
utilitarianism’ 63
3. ‘the wealth maximisation principle
encourages and rewards the ‘Calvinist’ or
‘Protestant’ virtues and capacities associated
with economic progress’ 64
4. ‘wealth maximisation is a more defensible
moral principle also in that it provides a
firmer foundation for a theory of distributive
and corrective justice,’ along with a firmer
commitment to the principle of rights than is
evident in utilitarian and Kantian thinking’ 65
5. pragmatic: ‘we look around the world and
see that in general people who live in
societies in which markets are allowed to
function more or less freely not only are
wealthier than people in other societies but
have more political rights, more liberty and
dignity, are more content…so that wealth
maximisation may be the most direct route 
to a variety of moral ends.’ 66
Posner makes a profoundly political judgement
about the benefits of the market solution for
dealing with issues of justice. In essence he
argues that arguments about the division of the
'cake' must come second to efforts to increase
the size of the 'cake'. Interestingly, he does not,
however, reject entirely the argument that
distributional issues have a role in judgements
of fairness; it is more of an argument about
ranking positions. For Posner, the creation of
wealth comes first; the distribution of that
wealth comes second. First efficiency, 
then equity.
Of course there are significant drawbacks to
both Kaldor-Hicks and Posner in their
approaches to assessment of validity for
regulations. Firstly, the approaches balance
Part V: Getting regulation to work for consumers
gains and losses in terms of money. Thus only
those benefits and losses that can be quantified
in monetary terms can be effectively taken into
account when dealing with a proposed
regulation or legal decision. Secondly, the
approaches take no explicit account of
distributional justice. The approaches thus
ignore a significant characteristic in many
regulatory systems and approaches. While such
an avoidance of distributional equity as an
issue may make life simpler in analytical terms,
it provides problems for regulators attempting
to deal with real-world problems. Finally, it
effectively allows the imposition of losses on
individuals, provided that it is more than
balanced by the gains afforded to beneficiaries.
This problem is not far from the argument
about distributional equity and is a factor in
many of the arguments made about equitable
regulation. 
Distributional equity is a broader social concern
driven by a desire to strive towards what Tobin
67 has called 'specific egalitarianism'. This is the
concern to ensure that the distribution of a
resource, or service is done in a manner that is
less unequal than a simple ability to pay
solution would provide for. However, a
distributional equity solution may involve
measures outside of an assessment of allocative
efficiency. As we discuss below, the decision-
making process should first assess and aim for
the allocative efficiency position before then




There have been numerous attempts at
reforming the way regulation works. Much
impetus for the reform of regulation has come
from the business world and its perception that
regulation is imposed upon them. The impetus
can almost be said to be a result of the triumph
of the argument that regulation arises as a
result of government failure and the desire of
the bureaucracy to grow at the expense of
business.
Two of the most far reaching examples of the
deregulatory push have come from the US and
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the UK. One of the first codified efforts to rein
in regulation was the introduction by Ronald
Reagan of a cost-benefit analysis element to the
executive order 12291. In Section 2 (General
Requirements) it stated that: ‘In promulgating
new regulations, reviewing existing
regulations, and developing legislative
proposals concerning regulation, all agencies to
the extent permitted by law shall adhere to the
following requirements:
1. Administrative decisions shall be based on
adequate information concerning the need
for, and consequences of, proposed
government action;
2. Regulatory action shall not be undertaken
unless the potential benefits to society for 
the regulation outweigh the potential costs 
to society;
3. Regulatory objectives shall be chosen to
maximise the benefits to society;
4. Among alternative approaches to any given
regulatory objective, the alternative involving
the least net costs to society shall be chosen;
and
5. Agencies shall set regulatory priorities with
the aim of maximising the aggregate net
benefits to society, taking into account the
condition of the particular industries affected
by regulations, the condition of the national
economy, and other regulatory actions
contemplated for the future.68
While the cost-benefit-analysis approach was
radical for its time, the order was vague
enough to allow little progress to be made in
reducing the burden of regulation. There was
some irony, for the proponents of government
failure to see a government trying to regulate
itself against its best instincts. 
In typically more muted fashion, the UK
developed its deregulation initiative in the
early 1990s. Instead of promulgating an
executive order, the UK opted for guidelines
called ‘Thinking about regulation: a guide to
good regulation (1993)’. Within the guidelines
was a 10-point plan to achieving good
regulation. The 10 points for regulators to
‘think about’ were: 
1. Identify the issue… keep the regulation in
proportion to the problem.
Consumers and regulation
2. Keep it simple… go for goal-based
regulation
3. Provide flexibility for the future…set the
objective rather than the detailed way of
making sure the regulation is kept to.
4. Keep it short
5. Try to anticipate the effects on competition 
or trade.
6. Minimise costs of compliance
7. Integrate with previous regulations
8. Make sure the regulation can be effectively
managed and enforced
9. Make sure that the regulation will work and
that you will know if it does not.
10.Allow enough time.
Much of the 10-point guideline reflects
established economic thinking about regulation
but falls short of imposing a time limit on
regulation. The idea of ‘sunset’ clauses on
regulation is not new and indeed some
elements of trade regulation have sunset
clauses for trade protection measures. 
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General understanding of the economics of
regulation too often focus on a simplistic
reading of classical economics or small
government. This tends to paint opponents
of a particular regulation into attacking all
regulation and the proponents of regulation
into defending all forms of regulation. What
is needed – and what must be the role of the
consumer organisation – is to balance
legitimate demands for regulation with a
clear-headed understanding of the real
dynamics of regulatory policy and its 
knock-on effects. 
Most commentators on regulation have a
clichéd view of the main developments and
tend to fall back on hackneyed short-hand
versions of the theories. Most claims of the
inefficiency and inappropriateness of regulation
rely on a simplistic interpretation of theories
that the developers of the theory would not
recognise. Thus we find that opponents of
universal service or social goals rely on a
simplistic reading of the Atkinson-Stiglitz
theorem (which roughly argues that under
certain assumptions, income is better
redistributed through taxation than other
regulatory policy). While the theorem is a
useful guide to understanding the efficiency of
regulation, it relies on assumptions that almost
never apply in reality (such as a lack of
consumption externalities and a tax system that
picks up all income). As with all theorems, the
lessons from Atkinson-Stiglitz can be taken too
far and often are. When the assumptions are
relaxed, we find that there emerges an
appropriate realm for regulation in dealing
with redistributive problems. 
The idea that redistribution is not a proper
realm for regulation has become a popular
refrain in business circles. There is a degree of
irony in this, as the Stigler/Peltzman approach
clearly recognises that a major driver of
regulation is the tendency of firms to engage in
battles for rent (and thus redistribution of the
gains of regulation). A recent article in the
Financial Times 69 provided a good example of
large industries in monopoly positions seeking
to remove regulation from their activities (on
spurious ‘competitiveness’ and ‘foreign
competition’ arguments) as a means of
maximising their rent at the expense of other
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businesses (their customers) and consumers. 
The issue is not about whether redistributive
elements do exist in regulation but how they
should be managed. We can learn something
from the work on progressive taxation to
understand where redistribution can play itself
out in regulation. Seligman 70 identified a
number of justifications for progressive taxation:
1. ‘Benefit Theory (also known as the ‘give and
take’ or ‘quid pro quo’ theory.) Protection is
the chief function of the State, and taxes can
be looked upon as the premiums one pays to
a collective insurance agency that guarantees
peace and order. But the greater one’s
property or income, the greater the benefits
received. However, the benefits are
proportional to ‘clear income’, income less
expenses. Hence the tax must be graduated
with respect to total income in order to
correspond to clear income. A variant to this
theory is that one should pay according to
the cost of the service that the State renders,
and this cost increases with clear income.
2. Equal sacrifice theory. A tax is a sacrifice and
we should all sacrifice equally. However, a $1
tax for someone making $10,000 yearly of
income is not the same as a $1 tax for
someone making $1mn yearly. To equalise
the sacrifice, the wealthy should pay a higher
fraction of their income in taxes.
3. Faculty theory. Individuals in society should
contribute to society in proportion to their
faculties or abilities. Income is a good
surrogate for faculty or ability.
4. Tax ill-gotten gains. The rich get rich
primarily by exploiting imperfections in the
government (e.g. bribes, hiring expensive
lawyers to bypass taxes, getting inside
information). They should pay more in taxes
to offset this ill-gotten advantage.’
Such an approach works well in general social
regulation; the more pressing question is the
degree to which it applies in economic
regulation. Here a distinction must be made
between competition policy and sectoral
regulation. In the case of the former, the policy
objectives and remits have become more
Conclusions
narrow over time. This focus has led to a
situation where modern competition policy
almost conforms to the cleanest model of
regulation. It also conforms to the Atkinson-
Stiglitz view of life; namely that markets are
best left to themselves and redistribution issues
are best left to politicians and governments. 
In contrast, sectorally regulated industries have
tended to either be created with specific social
and environmental goals in mind or had these
added to them over time. For sectoral
regulators, arguments for progressive taxation
have their sectoral corollaries. The tabulation
below indicates the possible parallels:
One can see that sectoral regulators have
redistributive powers built into their remits
because the ‘market’ they are regulating is
subject to failure, already provides a specific
distributional result and, left to its own
resources, would rebalance this distribution.
Such a recognition makes the comparison of
competition and sectoral regulation interesting.
It would tend to suggest that competition
policy is likely to have a problem in dealing
with sectors where the distribution of benefits
has been left unchallenged for a long time. In
such sectors those that gain from the
distribution tend to create complex
justifications for their seizing of the rents of
regulation and usually wrap their arguments in
the claim of consumer protection. The recent
arguments over Resale Price Maintenance of
over-the-counter medicines is a good example
of this. Here the pharmaceutical industry and
some pharmacists justified price -fixing (and
thus the misappropriation of the consumer
surplus) on the basis that the consumer interest
was being protected. Much of the argument
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against change was about the distribution of
rents; namely that competition would
redistribute rent to retailers and away from
manufacturers. This is a familiar argument to
justify restrictions on parallel trade and the
proper operation of the single market. It is also
always done in the name, rather than the
interest, of the consumer. 
If redistribution is likely to be a part of
regulation, we need to address two issues: 1)
what result is likely to emerge from this, and 2)
how should this process be managed. 
The result of incorporating redistribution
factors into the system of regulation, accepting
both government and market failure, is likely to
bring:
• ‘Public policy in social regulation will
conform neither to a strict Rawlsian
maximin’ or ‘least worst’ policy nor to a strict
utilitarian policy that would maximise
expected-benefits-less costs. Rather it will
conform to a perception-driven benefits-less-
costs policy, with perceptions influenced by
the publicity given to rare events, the
politicking of interest groups, and the
difficulty of formulating a public philosophy
of dealing with uncertain, potentially fatal
events. We can expect politicians to try to
capitalise on this confusion of concepts,
perceptions of reality, and special interests.
• As a corollary to point 1, economists who are
frustrated because policy makers to not
adopt a straightforward ‘maximise expected-
benefits-minus-expected-costs’ approach to
social regulation will continue to be
frustrated.
Conclusions
Progressive taxation and sectoral regulation compared
Personal taxation Sectoral regulation
Benefit theory Payment for collective RPI-X – paying the cost of 
benefits of society being granted monopoly rights
Equal sacrifice theory £1 to the poor is worth more Regulatory focus on consumers
than £1 to the rich
Faculty theory Tax should be paid on ability Distribution of pain in rebalancing 
to pay pricing formulae
Tax ill-gotten gains Punishment for beating system Windfall taxes
• ‘Grandfathering’ of status quo practice will
be the more frequent, the higher the cost of
changing the status quo.
• Up to a certain, critical size, large societies
and organisations are more likely to enact
social regulations or to obey enacted social
regulations than small ones. After the critical
size is reached the probability of enactment
or obeying will be only very weakly size
dependant.
• Although policy makers will not adopt a
simple ‘expected benefits minus expected
costs’ formula, costs will enter into the
perception driven, modified version referred
to in point 1. Inventors of a safety device
cannot expect its adoption because ‘the value
of a human life is infinite’. It will be adopted
only if it is cheap enough.
• Publicity will continue to play a large role in
influencing perceptions of benefits and costs
of social regulation.
• As a corollary of point 6, social regulation
can be expected to be self-limiting. Social
regulations with large cost burdens but small
benefits will induce political action to repeal
or modify them.’ 71
Given that social and economic regulation is
likely to be a messy and contested affair, one
must seek to identify the best way of managing
this problem. At the risk of adding to the
interminable lists of do’s and don’ts in the area,
we recommend the following:
Targets for regulation
Pick on the obvious targets
Go for the most egregious examples of
problems rather than regulate everything 
in sight.
Don’t over-extend or take things too far
The ‘final 10 %’ rule should always be borne 
in mind: Is it really worthwhile to extend
coverage of the regulation to everyone
irrespective of cost or is there a cheaper way 
of achieving the ends?
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Process for regulating in
normal markets
Start with efficiency and the
compensation principle
Always start clean before complicating matters.
Use Kaldor-Hicks as the starting point: Is the
change going to generate sufficient benefits for
the winners to compensate the losers? Question
one should always be about whether this policy
or regulation is efficiency enhancing.
Analyse distributional equity
The compensation principle is fine, as far as it
goes, but it does not go far enough. Regulators
must look at the distributional equity problems
that arise from their ‘clean’ analysis of the
problem. Where that analysis takes the
regulatory decision-making process cannot be
predetermined. Instead ,it should move to:
Look for ‘unfair’ redistribution or
negative externalities
This is the ‘should we care’ part of the analysis.
As every regulatory decision involves some
form of redistribution both from and to
someone, one has to ask if it is worth 
worrying about. There are two clear examples
where we should; firstly, where the
redistribution is unfair and where it results in
negative externalities for some consumers.
Unfairness is a subjective assessment and is
often best left to politicians. However, each
legal system is based on culturally-rooted
understanding of fairness, so it is legitimate to
bring it in as a question. The issue of negative
externalities is more complex. Just as all
regulation should look toward the possibility of
unintended side effects, this question should be
a part of the assessment process. This helps to
narrow down the distributional question to
fairness and unintended losers.
Should a balance be struck and if so
how best can it be done?
Given that every regulatory intervention will
involve some redistribution of benefits,
recognition must be made of the best means of
achieving that rebalancing. For example, in a
complex monopoly investigation into new car
pricing, the rebalancing was between
manufacturers, dealers and consumers. 
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The manufacturers losing out could not be a
reason not to move. The better question was
how best that rebalancing could be carried out.
That can only be answered by asking; 
Who can best deal with the 
spillover effects?
The division between how and who is a
artificial, as they are inextricably linked. Once
one has analysed distributional implications,
one must then identify how best to deal with
those implications. Here we have developed a
useful rubric originally put forward by Justice
Breyer in the US about regulation in general
(see above).
How will improvement in
efficiency and redistribution
affect rent seeking?
What is clear from the literature is that firms
and interest groups will seek to redistribute
rents in their favour and at the cost of someone
else. In carrying out this analysis, one must
always be aware that rent-seeking activity is
always likely to be displaced rather than
removed. The balance of power between those
rent seekers may be changed but such activity
will simply find a new home. If it becomes
clear that rent-seeking is likely to be displaced
to a government department, efforts should be
made to ensure that the department is
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insulated as far as possible and given
democratic accountability mechanisms, from
the increased thrust of rent-seeking. 
As can be seen from the typology of
distributional problems, solution, actors and
actions, the most common response to the
‘problem’ posed by relying on this particular
ordering of questions is to ensure sufficient
safety nets in the marketplace. This would
suggest a split set of answers. In the regulated
industries, the current distribution of powers is
such that the regulator itself is likely to have to
deal with all aspects of the regulation,
including its after-effects. However, in
competition policy, the spillover effects are
almost always going to be better dealt with by
other regulators, namely government
departments and politicians. 
This characterisation of the problem poses a
peculiar difficulty for the future direction of
regulatory policy. If one accepts that markets
and regulatory systems are prone to failure, be
it government or market, one must accept that
societally designed balancing mechanisms for
allocative efficiency and distributional equity
have to be acknowledged. What must also be
acknowledged is that any attempt to ‘clean up’
regulatory policy by making it focus more
clearly on allocative efficiency issues is likely to
have the effect of redirecting rent-seeking
activities to other regulatory agencies. Thus,
attempts to make merger policy more focused
on competition and consumer welfare will
Conclusions
Matches of regulatory ends, means and player
Problem Tentative solution Actor Direction of regulation
Rent control Taxes; deregulation Government/ Government or market
(excess profits) mixed market
Spillovers Marketable rights; Consumer Safety netted 
bargaining standards empowerment/ market
Government as 
ringmaster
Inadequate information Disclosure; screening; Governmental Safety netted market
standards setting; standard setting
bargaining
Other (moral hazard, Incentive-based Regulator/market Safety netted market
unequal bargaining regulation; standards
power, paternalism)
redirect rent-seeking by large firms toward
insulating themselves through industrial 
policy changes. 
Regulation is neither a clean nor an orderly
process. The literature on regulation should
make us sceptical of both industry and
regulatory claims for legitimacy in seeking new
or extended regulation. While it is true that
consumers almost always pay the cost of over-
or under-regulation, this is not on its own a
justification for total deregulation. Markets fail
pure and simple and relying on some
doctrinaire belief in their infallibility is as
simplistic as relying on regulators to order our
lives for us. Firms will seek regulation and will
seek to impose costs on consumers;
government departments and regulators will
seek to extend their power and budgets beyond
the reasonable. All this is clear from the
literature on the issue. What is not clear is how
to deal with it. 
Most economists have tended to argue for the
stricter application of efficiency based tests.
This is an important first step. However, it can
not be the only step. Recognition has to be
made that relying solely on efficiency
arguments will generate problems of
distributional equity and externalities of their
own. A more explicit ordering of the problem
must recognise that pure solutions cannot be
aimed for. Above all, regulatory discussion
should recognise that the choice is not simply
between State and market nor between
regulation and deregulation but between the
‘disagreeable and the intolerable’. 72 While it is
true that market-based mechanisms are
preferable for improving the allocation of
resources in a normal market, it does not follow
that distributional consequences can be
ignored. Thus there will always be some
regulatory role even in the most vigorous
market. As we signalled above, this role is
likely to be the operation of effective ‘safety
net’ style regulation – the classic domain of
consumer protection and promotion laws and
policies. It follows that whichever solution is
aimed at, it can only work if the consumer
engaged in the market in question is
sufficiently empowered and protected to make






The table below gives a general sketch of








Element Evidence Drivers for change
Consumer behaviour Framing and information
Cultural aspects to decision making
Consumer learning
Endowment effects 





The treatment of losses and gains























something until you’ve asked five times: ‘why?’
This rule-of-thumb helps to separate means
objectives from fundamental objectives. For
instance, if one is dealing with a consultation
on Universal Service Obligations, examination
of “why?” will move the issue from merely
protecting the tool of the USO to assessing how
to best deal with social exclusion (or the
pertinent fundamental objective). This takes the
issue from a ‘means to an end’ to the desired
end itself and allows for a wider mapping of
possible solutions. While it does not, however,
necessarily provide the right (or different)
answer, it does encourage a broader view.
If we can get the decision-making process more
finely tuned, we can hope to avoid the traps
identified below, many of which are common to
general decision-making processes. Raiffa et al
identify the eight most common errors in
decision-making, all of which are valid for
dealing with understanding markets:
• working on the wrong problem
• failing to identify your key objectives
• failing to develop a range of good, creative
alternatives
• overlooking crucial consequences of your
alternatives
• giving inadequate thought to tradeoffs
• disregarding uncertainty
• failing to account for your risk tolerance
• failing to plan ahead when decisions are
linked over time.
A number of more pernicious problems also
hamper incisive analysis. These are more
commonly thought of as psychological traps:
• The Anchoring Thoughts Trap: over-reliance
on the first information received about a
problem/issue
• The Status Quo Trap: keeping on doing what
has always been done
• The Sunk Cost Trap: current choices tend to
be biased by past choices, the tendency to
justify past decisions with current decisions
• The Confirming-Evidence Trap: seeking out
that evidence that confirms your original
view and under-weighting evidence that
indicates the opposite
• The Framing Trap: how is the question
posed? ‘Is it right that 5 million people will





To borrow from Howard Raiffa 73, a good
decision-making process:
• focuses on what’s important
• is logical and consistent
• acknowledges both subjective and objective
factors and blends analytical with intuitive
thinking;
• requires only as much information and
analysis as is necessary to resolve a particular
dilemma
• encourages and guides the gathering of
relevant information and informed opinion
• is straightforward, reliable, easy-to-use and
flexible
Raiffa et al describe the decision-making
process by dividing it into six stages (with three
added variables). As with all good
management techniques, the approach is
summed up as an mnemonic: PrOACT.
• Problem: what is the real problem being
assessed?
• Objectives: what are the real objectives a
decision?
• Alternatives: map all alternatives
• Consequences: try to map all consequences
for all possible alternatives
• Tradeoffs: recognise and deal with all
possible tradeoffs:
• Uncertainty: do some crystal-ball gazing;
• Risk tolerance: consider risk tolerance in
relation to likely outcomes
• Linked decisions: what are the side effects of
a decision likely to be?
Raiffa also points to another handy tool for
analysts, as embedded in the wisdom of the
Japanese saying: ‘You don’t truly understand
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Competition analysis produces results that can
be interpreted in multiple ways. For example, a
market with largely uniform prices can be a
result of fierce competition or tight collusion.
Steven Salop 74 identified a number of
common errors made in the definition of
market power. Salop characterised these errors
as following analytical traps:
• The Marginal Cost Trap: Mistaking a firm's
inability to profitably raise price above its
marginal cost for an inability to exercise
market power by excluding rivals.
Conversely, mistaking a firm's ability to
profitably raise price above its marginal cost
for an ability to exercise additional market
power by adopting alleged anti-competitive
behaviour.
• The Cellophane Trap: Mistaking a firm's
inability to exercise market power by raising
price above the current price for an inability
to have already exercised market power by
raising price up to the current level, thereby
mislabelling a completed anti-competitive act
as a lack of market power.
• The Price-Up Trap: Mistaking a firm's
inability to profitably raise price above the
current level for an inability to exercise
market power by preventing competitor's
conduct that otherwise would reduce price
below the current level, thereby mislabelling
a maintenance of market power as a lack of
market power.
• The Threshold Test Trap: Mistaking a firm's
inability to profitably raise price above the
current level because of current competitive
constraints from certain rivals for an inability







not gain from this market liberalisation?’ or
‘Is it right that 50 million people will gain
from this market liberalisation?’ (same issue,
different questions)
• The Overconfidence Trap (tied to the
anchoring problem): tendency to forecast
market behaviour based on initial forecasts
without dealing properly with all available
information
• The Recallability Trap: dramatic events skew
views of future probabilities (e.g. plane
crashes vs. car crashes)
• The Base Rate Trap: what are the underlying
assumptions about probabilities and are 
they robust?
• The Prudence Trap: opting for worst case
scenarios ‘just to be safe’
• The Outguessing Randomness Trap:
mistaking luck for a pattern – random things
happen in a random manner;
• The Surprised-by-Surprises Trap:
coincidences happen
Conclusion
Markets are extremely complex entities and it
would do well to follow these simple decision-
making rules when dealing with them:
• Follow decision making guidelines;
• Avoid common traps and retain objectivity
wherever possible;
• Break complex markets into comprehensible
bundles;
• Continually zoom in and out of the bundles
to ensure that you can see the whole from the
sum of its parts.
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Ideas discussed in Chapter I rest on work
carried out in behavioural and experimental
economics and psychology, as summa
rised below.
The classical model of consumer behaviour
rests on the belief that consumers act to
maximise their utility: ‘All human behaviour can
be viewed as involving participants who [1]
maximise their utility [2] from a stable set of
preferences and [3] accumulate an optimum
amount of information and other inputs in a
variety of markets.’ 78
Over time this assumption has come under
increasing challenge. In competition analyses,
the classical view of the utility-maximising
consumer can lead to demands that consumer
be given ever more information on which to
make rational judgements.
As Kahneman et al argue, there are two ways
in which the traditional approach to consumer
behaviour in economics can be altered. One is
to change the external environment facing the
consumer as decision-maker by introducing
such factors as information imperfections,
search and transactions costs, and risk. The
second, more controversial approach is to alter
the behavioural assumptions underlying
consumer behaviour by adding in motives or
including the possibility of apparently
irrational behaviour. However, the erosion of
the traditional approach has not been complete,
for at least two simple reasons: ‘First, adding
complexity to the model of the agent generally
makes it more difficult to derive unequivocal
predictions of behaviour from a specification of the
environment. Second, there is a threat of a slippery
slope. It appears all too easy to lengthen the lists of





• The Unilateral SSNIP (75) Trap: Mistaking a
firm's inability to profitably raise price above
the current level unilaterally (assuming that
rivals do not change their prices or outputs)
for an inability to exercise market power by
conduct that affects rivals' output and price
responses. The Unilateral SSNIP Trap is
closely related to the Threshold Test Trap.
The two traps are distinguished because the
errors to which they refer occur in different
contexts. For example, the unilateral SSNIP
Trap could arise in a horizontal agreement
case as well as in an exclusion case. The
Unilateral SSNIP Trap focuses on the market
definition methodology, whereas the
Threshold Test Trap focuses on an erroneous
finding of market power.
A further problem for market analysis is the
definition of errors related to predation. The
key problem in identifying predation is picking
normal competitive responses from predatory
behaviour. This has lead Joskow and Klevorick
76 to identify two types of errors 77. that can be
made in predatory pricing claims:
• Type I error: the identification of a
competitive price cut as a predatory price cut.
• Type II error: the failure to detect predatory
pricing 
Avoiding commission of Type I or Type II error
often comes down to a matter of judgement
and experience as much as analytical rigour
and data. This is often due to a lack of data that
would allow a proper analysis of a 
market event. 
non-economic motives or cognitive errors that
might affect economic behaviour.’ 79
Three key caveats need to be placed on the
classical approach: 
• Bounded rationality: human cognitive
abilities are not infinite and we all have both
limited computational skills and flawed
memories;
• Bounded willpower: people often take
actions in the short term that they know to be
in conflict with their own long-term interests; 
• Bounded self-interest: people generally care,
or act as if they care, about others, even
strangers, in some circumstances. 80
Bounded rationality
The theory of bounded rationality was first
espoused by the late Herbert Simon. The theory
argues that: ‘The capacity of the human mind
for formulating and solving complex problems
is very small compared with the size of the
problems whose solution is required for
objectively rational behaviour in the real world
– or even for a reasonable approximation to
such objective rationality.’ 81
Framing and information
In their introduction to their edited collection 
of essays, Hogarth and Reder point out that:
‘…in discussing choice anomalies that could be
attributed to ‘framing’ effects, Tversky and
Kahneman make a distinction between what they
term ‘transparent’ and ‘opaque’ versions of choice
problems. Briefly stated, when a problem is
presented in transparent form, choice behaviour
does not violate basic tents of rationality. When
choice problems are formulated in an opaque
manner, however, people may well violate basic
principles … because of the effect of ‘framing’ 
and so on.’ 82
Cultural aspects to decision making
Key elements to the understanding of cultural
elements to decision-making include:
• What is the culture of the market 
in question?
• In what sub-culture does the market sit?
• How will changes to that market affect the
cultural interactions of participants?
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Consumer learning
As Tversky and Kahneman state: ‘… effective
learning takes place only under certain conditions;
it requires accurate and immediate feedback about
the relation between the situational conditions and
the appropriate response. The necessary feedback is
often lacking for the decisions faced by managers,
entrepreneurs, and politicians because (i) outcomes
are commonly delayed and not easily attributable
to a particular action; (ii) variability in the
environment degrades the reliability of the feed-
back, especially where outcomes of low probability
are involved; (iii) there is often no information
about what the outcome would have been if another
decision had been taken; and (iv) most important
decisions are unique and therefore provide little
opportunity for learning ….’ 83
Bayes Theorem is useful in assessing learning.
The theorem states that when an individual has
to make a decision about the likelihood of a
particular outcome, he or she will start with a
set of beliefs about the probability based on
past experience and estimations. The new
decision will apply these prior beliefs to the
new situation and update the probability of an
event occurring. In other words, the Bayes
Theorem tells us that people learn from their
past experiences and use this to update their
beliefs in similar situations.
In addition to the factors in information
transmission outlined above, the distance in
time between particular decisions will have a
significant effect, as will the type of issue about
which decisions are made. 
Prospect Theory established a set of
experiments to test violations of the theory.
Tversky and Kahneman came to three general
conclusions:
• The structure of a problem may affect the
choices that are made. The same problem
presented in different ways may influence
the decisions of participants. 
• Outcomes received with certainty are over-
weighted compared to outcomes that are
uncertain.
• Gains get treated differently to losses. Losses
generate a risk seeking response while gains
produce a risk averse response.
Appendices
Richard A Thaler 84 generated a number of
experiments that produced the following
results:
Endowment Effect: Any product that is part of
the already existing endowment of the
individual will be more highly regarded than a
product that is not. Individuals thus tend to
rate what they already own more than a
product that they do not. 
Sunk Cost Effect: A sunk cost is an already
borne cost that is not easily recoverable.
Traditional economic theory argues that sunk
costs are irrelevant to current decisions,
focusing instead on incremental costs and
benefits. Thaler argued that individual sunk
costs did in fact affect decision-making. He also
linked it to:
Theory of Momentum has been important in
the study of international negotiation and
argues that individuals will complete a task
once work has begun, irrespective of the
continuing validity of the decision.
Search costs are relative: Any difference in
price between goods is seen in relation to the
total price of the goods.
Psychic costs of regret are large: Present
decisions can often be limited on the basis of
the individual not being able to trust
themselves to make the right decision in 
the future.
Consumers can show self-control and 
pre-commitment: Consumers often recognise
that their existing consumption patterns are
incapable of meeting certain future needs. This
prompts saving and tying the consumer into
patterns of committed expenditure. 
Losses and gains are treated differently:
Thaler identified four essential options for
dealing with combinations of losses and gains:
• segregate gains: individuals prefer to treat
multiple gains as a series of individual gains. 
• integrate losses: individuals like to place all
their losses in one basket.
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• let big gains cancel small losses: if the overall
balance of gains and losses is toward the
gain, then the losses should be pooled with
the gains to cancel them out;
• segregate ‘silver linings’: when large losses
out-weigh small gains, the gains may be
separated out as a ‘silver lining’ to the cloud
of the large loss. 
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Endnotes
Consumers International (CI) supports, links
and represents consumer groups and agencies
all over the world. It has a membership of over
250 organisations in 115 countries. It strives to
promote a fairer society through defending the
rights of all consumers, especially the poor,
marginalised and disadvantaged, by: 
• supporting and strengthening member
organisations and the consumer movement
in general 
• campaigning at the international level for
policies which respect consumer concerns. 
Consumers International was founded in 1960
as the International Organisation of Consumers
Unions (IOCU) by a group of national
consumer organisations. The group recognised
that they could build upon their individual
strengths by working across national borders.
The organisation rapidly grew and soon
became established as the voice of the
international consumer movement on issues
such as product and food standards, health and
patients’ rights, the environment and
sustainable consumption, and the regulation of
international trade and public utilities. 
Consumers International is an independent,
non-profit organisation. It is not aligned with or
supported by any political party or industry. It
is funded by fees from member organisations
and by grants from foundations, governments
and multilateral agencies.
Consumers International’s Head Office is based
in London. It has Regional Offices in Kuala
Lumpur (Malaysia), Santiago (Chile) and
Harare (Zimbabwe), and in London.
95




24 Highbury Crescent, London N5 1RX, UK
Tel: +44 20 7226 6663    Fax: +44 20 7354 0607
E-mail: consint@consint.org 
Office for Asia & the Pacific  
5th Floor Wisma WIM, 7 Jalan Abang Haji Openg, 
Taman Tun Dr. Ismail, 60000 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
Tel: (+603) 7726 1599    Fax: (+603) 7726 8599
E-mail: consint@ciroap.org 
Office for Latin America & the Caribbean 
Casilla 9635, Santiago, Chile
Tel: (+56-2) 335 1695     Fax: (+56-2) 231 0773
E-mail: consint@consint.cl 
Office for Africa  
Private Bag A6215, Avondale, Harare, Zimbabwe
Tel: (+263-4) 302 283    Fax: (+263-4) 303 092
E-mail: roaf@harare.iafrica.com
Office for Developed and Transition Economies 
24 Highbury Crescent, London N5 1RX, UK
Tel: (+44 20) 7226 6663    Fax: (+44 20) 7354 0607
E-mail: odte@consint.org 
For further information please visit our website: 
http://www.consumersinternational.org
